The method sounds interesting and all... but I think we're going to end up doing something a little more *traditional* in this regard. Asset voting et al is off the table - though it does sound like an interesting idea.
At this point, I'd say the choice is between IRV/STV and some form of range/approval voting (for single and multi-winner elections). The issue of later-no-harm may come into play, though, and cause IRV/STV to be the choice... As it is, students tend to bullet vote under the current system for multi-candidate elections, and it would be good to try to eliminate this (which systems failing later-no-harm won't do). MMPO sounds like it has too many drawbacks to be a suitable IRV replacement in this regard... Does anyone have any suggestions as far as improvements to IRV that improve performance while maintaining later-no-harm OR systems that come close to satisfying later-no-harm (It seems like some Condorcet methods might - especially those that fail later-no-help). I'm looking for single as well as multi-winner (most of the elections are multi-winner, though there are executive elections and a few others that are single-seat...). Currently, the best option I have seen as far as IRV is the candidate withdrawal variant - where a candidate can withdraw and force a recount. Thanks for all the advice, though, and I will be looking into everything when discussing this... Tim On 12/22/06, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> That said, I really don't like the process of asset voting - which seems > like a separate idea than proxies. This is because it takes control away
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