How about "the smallest number of ballots on which some alternative that beats A pairwise is ranked higher than A"?
Juho On Dec 31, 2006, at 3:52 , Simmons, Forest wrote: > Here's a version that is both clone proof and monotonic: > > The winner is the alternative A with the smallest number of ballots > on which alternatives that beat A pairwise are ranked in first > place. [shared first place slots are counted fractionally] > > That's it. > > This method satisfies the Smith Criterion, Monotonicity, and Clone > Independence. > > I'll leave it up to Chris to tell us which of Woodall's criteria > are not respected by this method. > > I also like the stochastic version that chooses by random ballot > from the set of alternatives S, such that for each A in S, at > most fifty percent of the first place slots are taken up by > alternatives that beat A pairwise. > > Forest > <winmail.dat> > ---- > election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for > list info ___________________________________________________________ Yahoo! Messenger - with free PC-PC calling and photo sharing. http://uk.messenger.yahoo.com ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
