Kevin Venzke wrote:
Brian,
--- Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
If I understand this, it's a Condorcet cycle resolution system based
purely on who was 1st pick on each ballot. So, count up the virtual
round robin matrix, and count 1st place votes separately for later if
needed.
It's incomplete. A Condorcet method can elect someone no one put in
for first place. It can even have a cycle of people no one voted for
first place.
It counts first preferences of candidates defeating the potential
winner pairwise. A CW will always have a score of zero under this
method.
However, you are right about there being a little cause for concern:
34 A>E>F
33 B>E>F
33 C>E>F
I believe this is an E-F tie. E's win over F is worthless due to E's
lack of first preferences.
Kevin Venzke
On the pure method Forest suggested, I make this an A-E-F tie (all
with a score of zero).
But what is wrong with my suggestion of first dropping from the ballots
the non-members of the
Schwartz set?
Chris Benham
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