Warren Smith wrote:
>Here is the current CRV web page about this problems and its (lack of) solution > >We are speaking about puzzle #5 at >http://www.rangevoting.org/PuzzlePage.html > >--- > > Puzzle #5: Voting systems immune to clones and avoiding favorite-betrayal > >Puzzle: >Two desirable properties of a voting system - both of which Range Voting has - >are "immunity to candidate-cloning" (ICC) and "avoiding favorite betrayal" >(AFB). >AFB: voters should never have strategic incentive to "betray" their favorite >candidate by voting him below some other. >ICC: political parties should be unable to usefully manipulate an election by >running clones of their own, or of an opposed, candidate; voters here are >assumed to vote honestly and to have only tiny preferences (which they may >express in their votes, if they exist) among the clones. > By this definition Range fails "ICC" because voters can only express preferences among clones by not giving maximum possible score to all of them, thus making it possible that if a narrow winner is replaced by a set of clones all the clones lose. >Note: Many voting systems are known (beyond just variants of range voting) >which satisfy AFB > Many? There is MCA, ER-Bucklin(Whole), one or two Kevin Venzke methods and what else? Chris Benham ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
