Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:00 PM 1/20/2007, Chris Benham wrote:
By this definition Range fails "ICC" because voters can only express
preferences among clones by not giving maximum possible score to all of
them, thus making it
possible that if a narrow winner is replaced by a set of clones all the
clones lose.
Now, tell me, why should an election system provide a means for
voters to express a preference between clones, when they consider
them equally fit for the office?
Benham is correct that Range would not allow a voter to express a max
score to one candidate and a lower score to another, without risking
the loss of the second one as he described. If a voter considers two
candidates clones, the rational vote under Range is to rate them
identically. "Favorite", between clones, is meaningless. If the voter
has a preference, they aren't clones to the voter.
Wrong. That is not how Warren defined clones for his purpose, nor is it
how they are regularly
defined.
*clones*
A set of alternatives, X[1], X[2], .. X[m] is a clone set provided
that for
every alternative Z, where Z is not one of X[1], .. X[m], the
following is true:
Every ballot that ranks Z higher than one of X[1] .. X[m] ranks Z
higher than all of them. Every ballot that ranks Z lower than one of
them, ranks Z lower than all of them. No ballot ranks Z equal to any
of them.
As well, there must be at least one alternative outside the set of
clones, and at least two alternatives in the set of clones.
So this:
Now, tell me, why should an election system provide a means for
voters to express a preference between clones, when they consider
them equally fit for the office?
is more-or-less a contradiction in terms.
Okay, so I looked up "clone." It has a special meaning; the term was
invented to apply to ranked methods. According to the current
Wikipedia article on Strategic Nomination:
Clones in this context are candidates such that every voter ranks
them the same relative to every other candidate, i.e. two clones of
each other are never both strictly separated by a third member in
the preference ranking of any voter, unless that member is also a fellow clone.
Yes.
Because of this definition, it is possible that all voters would rank
two candidates the same, but would sincerely rate them differently,..
I think you have that the wrong way round.
Chris Benham
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