At 10:40 AM 1/25/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote: I wrote:
>1 A>B>C >1 B>C>A >1 A>B>C (from C>A>B) > > > Indeed, > > >this creates a clone. The election now has two voters for one > > >candidate, and one for the remaining candidate. As long as the > > >method would elect a favorite of a 2/3 majority, it violates ICC. This is a classic error in proof. (Note that I was saying that the procedure was defective.) The election pattern shown above displays a clone. ICC says that the insertion of a clone will not change the election outcome. Okay, what is the insertion of a clone and what is it inserted into? B and C are clones. Let's eliminate C. So we now have A>B B>A A>B Inserting the clone C does not change the election outcome, which remains either inside or outside the clone set, whatever it was before the insertion. In this case A wins in both cases. The illusion that C changes the outcome is created by comparing the outcome of the "set with a clone in it" with that of the "set without Favorite Betrayal," not that of the "set with no clone." The discussion here bristles with red herrings. I remain convinced, now, the proof is defective, it has a clear logical error in it. ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
