When advocates of Plurality, IRV, Borda, etc., or even RV, try to play-up
Condorcet as having a strategy problem, its reminiscent of that scent in
_How I Won the War_, in which the Lt., Michael Caine, is reviewing his
squad, out in the Sahara desert. Theyre lined up in a row for inspection.
One of them is wearing a clown suit, and covered with blue dye. Caine walks
past the clown, and stops at the next man, and says, Youre out of uniform!
You dont have your collar-stays!
Condorcet critics say that order-reversal is a problem. But it carries a
penalty, an easily-enforced penalty. Defensive truncation by the intended
victims. Offensive order-reversal can succeed only if its victims are trying
to help its perpetrators. Wouldnt that make you proud of yourself.
Offensive order-reversal is an unnatural way to vote, voting someone worse
over a compromise that you probably need--and the Condorcet Winner (CW) is
the ultimate compromise. Order-reversal, as a strategy, would require
organization. Its victims would hear about it in advance. On the other hand,
defensive truncation is natural. In fact truncation neednt even be
strategic. Principled voters wont rank someone whom they dont believe to
deserve a vote.
Critics liken the Order-reversal/truncation game to a game of chicken. But
its one in which the reversers are at a disadvantage. They have more to
lose, and their position is plainly the immoral one.
What if theres no significant amount of order-reversal? If
preference-falsification doesnt occur on a scale sufficient to change the
outcome, then SFC and GSFC apply. As Ive said before, SFC & GSFC are the
pinnacle of the promise of rank-balloting. With SFC-complying methods, if a
majority agree with you that some greater-evil is worse than the CW, and
falsification doesnt take place on a scale sufficient to change the
outcome, you and your majority need do nothing more than rank sincerely in
order to defeat the greater-evil.
Some Condorcet critics fear that Condorcet will elect a low-SU CW. But, if
voting is spatial, based on issues, and if we use city-block distance (as
Ive argued we should), then the CW is always the SU maximizer. Even if we
use Pythagorean (Euclidean) distance, the CW is the SU maximizer under the
conditions used in simulations, such as a multidimensional normal
distribution of voters, or uniform distribution.
Some argue that scandals could make a candidate who is low-SU for
non-spatial reasons. But surely the CW region of issue-space will be
well-populated, with candidates who don't have nonspatial disutility such as
scandals.
Some fear that people will vote someone up as a compromise merely because
they know nothing about him/her. That's their choice. They're adults. Maybe
they know something about another candidate, and it isn't good. Warren's
dark-horse worry is probably a revival of that fear.
A few years ago, Kevin proposed 2 methods that meet FBC & SFC, among other
criteria. The 2nd one was reasonably problem-free. I liked it because, by
meeting FBC, it offers something for the very most timid voters. Now I feel
that I was a bit cynical, and Id rather have GSFC than FBC, appealing to
hope rather than to fear.
But Kevins method is simpler than Condorcet, and that could be a decisive
advantage.
But now even Kevin no longer advocates that method, so I dont usually bring
it up here. I do claim, however, that Kevins FBC & SFC method should be
proposed to CVD, because its simpler than Condorcet, and simpler than IRV.
Schwartz Sequential Dropping (SSD) is my best proposal for public elections.
RV and Approval are good if people feel that SSD is too complicated, as is
Kevins method.
RV, like Approval (which is the simplest RV) meets FBC & WDSC. Thats a lot
of benefit for such a simple method. In general I prefer Approval, partly
because of its greater simplicity, and partly because a sincere ballot and a
strategic ballot are pretty much the same. But, with members of the public,
I havent had good reactions to Approval. Everyone considers it illegal
Plurality, a violation of 1-person-1-vote, a rule which encodeds
Plurallity, and maybe IRV. Because of that confusion, RV is an easier
proposal. RV is already familiar and popular, and probably has a better
chance of enaction than does Approval.
Of course the way to offer Approval is to first offer RV, and then, when
theres agreement about RV, point out that Approval is the simplest RV, the
0,1 RV. Maybe thats the most practical route. Propose RV, and then offer
Approval as the simplest, most easily-implemented RV, one that doesnt even
need new ballots (except that vote for 1 needs to be replaced by vote for
1 or more. Two new words printed on the ballot. Thats all the change that
Approval needs.
So thats what I like for a public single-winner proposal:
1. SSD
2. Kevins method
3. Approval (introduced as the simplest RV)
4. RV
RV isnt a bad method, and its very winnable, but lets not get carried
away and say that RV is as good as Condorcet.
Mike Ossipoff
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