THANK YOU! A difficult task but I like your words. On Thu, 08 Feb 2007 21:17:01 +0000 Michael Ossipoff wrote: > > I’d said: > > Range Voting isn't a bad method, and it's very winnable, but let's not > get carried away and say that RV is as good as Condorcet. > > Warren replies: > > --my earlier post which stimulated this, was merely claiming that, as a > matter of experimental fact, Range Voting produces Condorcet winners > more often than Condorcet methods do. At first this statement seems > impossible by definition, but the reason it is true is I am speaking of > a 50-50 honest+strategic voter mix > > I reply: > > So you’re making unjustified assumptions about how people will vote. You > seem to be assuming that people will vote as sincerely in RV as they > would in wv Condorcet. Not a safe assumption. > > Warren continues: > > , and asking what it the probability the winner is the same as the > (honest voter) Condorcet winner. My computer sims showed that range > voting does so more often than Condorcet methods based on rank-order > ballots. Paradoxical seeming. But true. Since this is an experimental > fact, it is indisputable. > > I reply: > > It’s indisputable in the world of your simulation. To claim that it’s > indisputable outside that world is to assume a lot. You’re assuming that > the premises on which your simulation is based are all correct, > including your assumption that people will vote as honestly in RV as in > wv Condorcet. Always be careful when drawing conclusions about the real > world from simulation results for single-winner methods. With > apportionment, simulations are more reliable, if we know the form of the > state-size frequency density distribution. > > > Warren said: > > Computer simulations. The page discussing this is > http://www.rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html (Also, same results happen > for other mixes than 50-50...) CAVEAT: I should note that IEVS presently > is only doing rank order ballots, I.e. equalities in rankings were > forbidden in these sims. > > I reply: > > That invalidates the simulations. Equal ranking is allowed in every > Condorcet proposal that I’ve heard of, including all the proposals of wv > Condorcet, such as SSD and BeatpathWinner in particular. > > Warren said: > > Quite possibly the situation would change in future IEVS versions that > will permit rank-equalities and wv-condorcet methods. I urge EMers to > help me program more such stuff into IEVS. The IEVS source code (which > continues to evolve) is available http://www.rangevoting.org/IEVS/IEVS.c > To riposte to the caveat, I note that there are theoretical reasons why > range voting is highly likely to generate honest-voter-Condorcet winers, > when the range voters are strategic. The theorem is presented at > http://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW.html . > > I reply: > > Riker showed that, with any method, a sufficiently well-informed > strategic-voting electorate will choose the CW every time. It was > referenced in _Scientific American_, in ‘76 or ‘77. Probably July or > thereabouts. > > Warren said: > > I am not sure that Ossipoff was aware of this theorem > > I reply: > > As I said, it’s true for all methods. > > or that he was aware of my computer-sim results. I want to make it clear > I am not just ranting the counterintuitive claim that range voting is > more likely to generate Condorcet winners than Condorcet methods. I am > proving it via both theorem and computer simulation. (The computer sims > are independent evidence from this theorem since they were not using the > kind of strategic voters in the theorem, at all.) In the model of > strategic behavior in this theorem, range voting with strategic voters > generates Condorcet winners 100% of the time when they exist. Condorcet > methods - even wv-condorcet methods with rank-equalities permitted - > presumably do so less than 100% of the time? > > I reply: > > Riker’s statement applies to wv Condorcet as well as to RV, and to every > method. > > What you’re missing is that Condorcet wv allows sincere voting much more > than RV does. That’s why my single-winner criteria have always been > about how much a method penalizes sincere voting. That’s the subject of > all of my defensive strategy criteria. > > > > If yes, then range is definitely better than Condorcet methods for the > purpose of generating Condorcet winners; if no, they are the same. > > I reply: > > You haven’t proven that RV is equal to or the same as wv Condorcet for > choosing C.W.s. > > It’s all in the assumptions on which your work is based. > > Mike Ossipoff -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice.
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