>Benham: Moulin's proof (by Schulze) --WDS: Thank you. (I had already put this proof, credited to Schulze, in my own paper last year, with his permission.) I note that this proof works regardless of whether rank-equalities are permitted in the Condorcet ballots. It shows voting honestly can hurt you (versus not voting at all) in every Condorcet system.
>Ritchie: Strategy in Condorcet... order reversal? --WDS: There seems to be the idea in either Ritchie's or other minds that, if you allow equalities in rankings in a Condorcet voting systems (and/or, handle them via "winning votes") then "order reversal" will not be required of a strategic voter. I believe that idea is false. I suspect that in every Condorcet system, whether rank-equalities are allowed or not, and whether "winning-votes" are used or not, there are election situations where you (a voter or co-feeling small bloc of voters) must cast a vote which is fully-dishonest about one or more orderings, i.e in which you say A>B when you honestly feel B>A. If you do not do this in your vote, then you get a worse election winner. One way to set up such a situation (which should work against most of the Condorcet systems discussed on EM) is this. You honestly feel A>C>the other candidates. If you do nothing or vote honestly, then C will be the Condorcet winner. If you vote A>the others>C then C will no longer be the Condorcet winner allowing A to win. If you rank the others EQUAL to C then C will still be the Condorcet winner. >Ossipoff: ...elections in which equal ranking is disallowed. Of course no one is proposing such a version of Condorcet. --WDS: Tideman in his 2006 book recommends exactly that. Just because the most recent and important book in an area recommends something, does that mean that Ossipoff should retreat one iota from his stance that "no one" does? >WDS: In IEVS, presently, equal rankings are forbidden in rank-order >methods. >M.Ossipoff: which (like Warren's other assumptions) makes the results meaningless. >WDS: I do not agree I ever made any "assumption" here. >M.O.: If you didn't assume or believe the premises you based your simulation on, then even you must not have believed that your simulation's results would have any relevance to real-world elections. Shall we call them simulation-premises instead of assumptions then, to avoid any speculation about what you were thinking? ...if your simulation is based on counterfactual premises, then its results won't mean anything. --WDS: I did not make this "assumption." I did not "base my simulation on" it. I did not make these "premises." I did not make these "simulation-premises." It would indeed be good if you avoided speculation about what I think. Or even worse, what everybody thinks. If you must make such speculations, please label them as speculations, not as certainties. Warren D Smith http://rangevoting.org ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
