Juho--
You said:
Here's my example. It is in principle the same one I already used but now
presented as a bit more realistic scenario.
I reply:
Ok, if its effectively the same as your first example, then doesnt
everything that I said about your first example apply to this one too?
But Id like to make a few comments:
We have three candidates: D=Democrat, C=CentristRepublican,
R=RightWingRepublican. I don't have any small party candidates, and that's
maybe a deviation from realism, but let's do this simple scenario first.
Sincere votes: 21: D 21: DC 03: DR 03: CD 26: CR 26: RC Many Democratic
voters truncated since they were not interested in the Republican party
internal battle between R and C. The R supporters note that they could vote
RD and get R elected (with winning votes). They spread the word among the R
supporters and press to to reach the required number of voters.
I reply:
The obvious problem with that is that such a strategy campaign would also
inform the intended victims, who would refuse to rank the candidate whose
voters were trying to steal the election from them. The result would be that
the offensive order-reversal would backfire.
Offensive order-reversal, for that reason, wont be a problem. But
truncation will be a problem with methods (such as margins) that let it be a
problem.
6 out of the 26 R supporters follow the recommended strategy (=> 20: RC, 06:
RD). R wins (with winning votes). Is this scenario a credible real life
scenario?
I reply:
No, because the intended victims would refuse to rank the
perpetratorscandidate, and so the offensive strategy attempt would
backfire.
That can be likewise said of your first example, but its more obvious in
this one, in which you mention the press campaign for offensive strategy.
You ask:
Is there a risk that this strategy would backfire?
I reply:
Of course. Why would the strategys intended victims rank the perpetrators
candidate?
How often does it happen that supporters of one candidate have the
possibility to influence the outcome of the election?
I reply:
Examples suggest that that will often be the case.
You said:
P.S. One more example on winning votes and truncation. 49:AB, 48:BC, 2:CA. A
supporters truncate => C wins.
I reply:
No method can help voters who wont help themselves by voting for a
compromise that they need.
You continued:
Or alternatively sincere votes are 49:AB, 48:BC, 2:CB. In this case
truncation by A supporters makes it possible for C supporters to vote
strategically 2:CA => C wins (instead of B that was A supporters' second
favourite).
I reply:
The same comment applies here. Additionally, doesnt everything that I said
about your first example apply here too?
Mike Ossipoff
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