On Wed, 22 Aug 2007 09:28:24 -0300 Diego Renato wrote: > 2007/8/22, Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>: > > A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise. > > The goal: Make sure the compromise wins. > > The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority. > > A concrete example: true ratings are > 55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0 > 45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0 > > THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)! > > The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically... > > Good luck & have fun :-) > > > Since A has a majority, no method is guaranteed to elect C. If both A > and B voters are not sure which faction is larger, it is possible vote > for their preferred candidate and C under approval voting, or put C > highly rated under range voting, and C be elected.
Diego lists both: Approval - at least 56 A and B voters also approving C - reducible by some giving up on approving A or B. Range - similar adjustment via ratings. NOT MENTIONED - Condorcet: 46 A voters ranking C at top, without any giving up on the A vs B competition - reducible by B voters cooperating in this. > > ________________________________ > Diego Santos -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info