At 02:55 AM 8/22/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote: >A common situation: 2 factions & 1 good compromise. > >The goal: Make sure the compromise wins. > >The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority. > >A concrete example: true ratings are > 55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0 > 45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0 > >THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)! > >The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically...
Okay, here is my solution. The B voters gain some very substantial advantage for the election of C over the favorite of the A voters, who have only a substantially smaller preference for A over C. So the B voters offer something of value to the A voters to compensate them for their loss. As an example, they promise to donate to the public treasury an amount sufficient to compensate the A voters for their loss of value, thus, essentially, paying a differential tax in order to get what they want. The payment is either irrevocably secured, if C is elected, or on deposit with a trustee. The original conditions assume commensurability of utilities, so the ability to pay is actually equal among the voters. Payment might not be in cash, but in terms of some other cooperation. (This is somewhat counter-intuitive, but I won't explain it here.) In deliberative process, this happens all the time. "I'll vote for your bill if you will vote for mine." Logrolling, it's called, and it is a basic feature of democracy, making majority rule far more flexible than it might otherwise be. Sometimes common practices are there for a reason, and taking steps to outlaw them or make them difficult could actually harm the process far more than allowing it, and, perhaps, making it more explicit. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
