On August 29 raphfrk wrote ... >Most candidates would prefer a 45% chance that they will win >over a 100% chance that they won't. Their own personal utlities >will swamp any difference in factional utilities.
I'm not sure about the "most" but it does seem true that at least some of the more ego stricken candidates would be less willing to compromise than their supporters. [However, in the challenge, if C voted for himself above A or B, it didn't register.] So (in the challenge example) asset voting based on random ballot might do no better than plain random ballot, if A is one of those big ego types. Is there a possibility of asset voting where the candidate proxies are more constrained by their supporters? Even DYN, which delegates less power to the proxy than asset voting, might benefit from more good ideas along these lines. Perhaps candidates should be required to publish their range ballots before the election, and their "trading" of assets should be required to be "rational" relative to these announced ratings? Or perhaps, a randomly chose jury of candidate X supporters should have some say in the candidate X proxy decisions? Forest ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
