At 06:27 PM 9/2/2007, Forest W Simmons wrote: >I'm not sure about the "most" but it does seem true that at least some >of the more ego stricken candidates would be less willing to compromise >than their supporters. [However, in the challenge, if C voted for >himself above A or B, it didn't register.]
Well, as stated, there is no C faction, if we name factions by their first choice. Yet, contrary to this, the universe of options is narrow. Negotiationof compensation, as I've come to realize, could shift the utilities by essentially modifying the choices. I.e., instead of the choices being A, B, or C, they would become A with compensation to the 45% faction of $X B with compensation to the 55% faction of $Y. C with compensation to the 45% faction of $M and the 55% faction of $N. If the given ratings as given are commensurable utilities such that they can be meaningfully summed, we immediately recognize C as the efficient compromise, requiring the smallest total compensation. If we assume that whatever goes to one faction, net, must come from the other faction, then there is a net utility for each faction that is equalized, with the proper values of X, Y, M, and N. Jobst looked at this in a restricted way, and wondered why the B voters should compensate the A voters, if the best compromise was being chosen. But the benefit of the "best compromise" -- or the loss of it, as could be the case -- is not equally distributed. Here the majority is losing and may, indeed, be able to force their outcome. However, justice is what I was considering, not power as such, even though being in the majority is power. And justice would clearly indicate the most just outcome as the one which evenly distributes benefit or loss, other things being equal. (i.e., we might assert some distortion if one faction was wealthier than another, for example, but that would be noise in this study. Indeed, it could shift utilities, but we would have complicated the situation.) What negotiation would do is to introduce a whole family of other options than the raw choices of A, B, or C. If it's a public facility being chosen, as the example I used, the proposal could be modified such that it was funded by a tax that was different on different districts. Or the whole thing could be done voluntarily, outside of government or tax funding of compensation. It all, ultimately, comes out of the same set of pockets, though. If the negotiation is voluntary, it should, if done efficiently and the factions are well-represented in it (delegable proxy, anyone?), shift the utilities so that they are maximized for all, rationally, all voters would then support the outcome developed through negotiation. The proof of this, of course, would be the election results, but the negotiations could indeed set up preset compensation that depends on the election outcome. Folks, this could be done *now*. It does not depend on changes in law. It does not buy votes, for the compensation is dependent, not on any individual vote, but on the outcome. "If this community passes this initiative, I will donate $X to a fund for community benefit," would be legal. "If the community center is built at C, I, as trustee for the B voters, will pay $X to every citizen who offered to pay $Y if A is elected." And the funds have been collected, or pledged on security, and then paid according to the outcome. Nobody is required to participate in this, and nobody is paid according to how they voted. You get paid, however, if you made a binding bid. (It's possible that the bids could be individual amounts, and thus even where utilities were not evenly distributed in a group, they could *all* be equalized. If you bid more for your option, you are implying an increased value to you of that option. "Which would you rather have, A, or $X?" If you bid inaccurately, you may get what your bid indicated! Some people, if they know how the bidding is gone, may exaggerate their bid if they are confident that the other option will be chosen, but they are running the risk that this will cause their bid to be accepted by the electorate. And the negotiators could specifically cap the compensation, if they suspected this was going on. With a travel distance utility underlying the process, exaggerated bids would be pretty visible.) In any case, I find the idea of shifting preferences through compensation based on outcome to be quite interesting. If only a small number participate, it would improve election outcomes a small amount. If large numbers participate, it could make democracy function more efficiently and fairly without changes in law. Those kind of solutions truly interest me, because they bypass the entrenched interests which can often block changes in law that threaten their inequitable power. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
