On Dec 12, 2007, at 17:44 , Kevin Venzke wrote: > the thing that isn't obvious is that implementing an > approval cutoff would result in people using it in a sincere way > rather > than as a strategic tool.
> --- Diego Santos <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >> >> A "approval quorum" rule will avoid low utility CW to win. And, >> opposit >> to >> Jonanthan argument, an approval cuttoff does not add too much >> complexity: >> it >> is like a hypothetical candidate NOTB (none of the below). > > This makes me repeat my comment: Why desire voters to rank among > the NOTB > candidates if the whole purpose of specifying NOTB is to allow us > to ignore > those rankings? The approval cutoff would probably add some more complexity than just marking the NOTB limit in the ranking. That is because the optimal strategy in marking the NOTB limit is probably not to mark it according to one's sincere opinion. At least in basic Approval that is the case. In basic Condorcet (with pure rankings only) the typical optimal strategy is to vote sincerely (the remaining strategic cases can be seen as exceptions to this main rule). I don't fully agree that "the whole purpose of specifying NOTB is to allow us to ignore those rankings". It think in this case it is good to allow a voter to say "I don't support A and B but in the case that one of them will be elected I prefer A to B". Juho ___________________________________________________________ All new Yahoo! Mail "The new Interface is stunning in its simplicity and ease of use." - PC Magazine http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info