I was not enough clear when i wrote my previous email. The '>>' is not a real approval mark on the ballot, it was only a "satisfaction limit" from each voter. I am arguing that not always the Condorcet winner is the one that maximizes happiness of the people, as Jonathan pointed.
A "approval quorum" rule will avoid low utility CW to win. And, opposit to Jonanthan argument, an approval cuttoff does not add too much complexity: it is like a hypothetical candidate NOTB (none of the below). 2007/12/11, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > On Tue, 11 Dec 2007 12:20:49 -0800 Jonathan Lundell wrote: > > On Dec 11, 2007, at 6:05 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote: > > > > > >>Jonathan, > >> > >>--- Jonathan Lundell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > >> > >>>...should choose B as a good compromise, with the A voters saying A > >>>is > >>>good, B OK, C very bad. But Diego's profile suggests to me that the A > >>>voters are saying something like A is good, B is bad, C is very bad. > >>>Not that they can express it in a normal linear ballot, just that > >>>we're being told a little more about their opinions. > >> > >>In my opinion, to the extent that the effect of a ">>bad>verybad" > >>vote is > >>disregarded, the point of letting voters indicate such preferences is > >>undermined anyway. > > > > > > I'm not advocating it as a ballot option, only as a meta-notation > > shorthand to give us kibitzers a little more information about the > > voters' utility functions. > > > > > >> > >>>In my example, the effect of a later-no-harm voting rule is evident. > >>>In Diego's, a rule (such as STV) that elects A doesn't seem > >>>unreasonable to me. > >>> > >>>The problem is that with an ordinary linear ballot (no '>>'), we > >>>can't > >>>distinguish between the cases. Not that I'm arguing that we should > >>>employ '>>'; offhand, that strikes me as a complication to be > >>>avoided. > >> > >>In one sense I don't agree. If >> is allowed then apparently it's > >>safe to > >>vote ">>bad>verybad." If >> isn't allowed then voters will probably > >>be more > >>cautious, since the method could very well take them as serious if > >>they say > >>that bad is better than verybad. > >> > >>I tend to think that if B doesn't win in Diego's scenario, the > >>method is > >>second-guessing the voters. It either disbelieves the C voters' > >>preference > >>for B over A, or finds that there's something more important than > >>majority > >>rule. > > > > > > There's a reasonable argument to be made (hardly originally by me) on > > either side of the question of whether a compromise candidate is > > sometimes (or always) better to the candidate of one faction in a > > close election. > > > > If the vote were: > > > > 53 A > > 47 C > > > > ...we'd shrug and call it a fairly close election, or at least no > > landslide, and forget about it, even if all 100 voters strongly > > disapproved of the opposing candidate. If we introduce a third > > candidate whom the A and C voters despise only slightly less than C > > and A respectively, and end up with something like Diego's profile, we > > have 100 (or 90 in that profile) unhappy voters instead of 47. > > A and C agree that B is better than their standard enemy. > > C voters will be happy to help install B, since this is better than > installing A. A voters may be a bit unhappy, but they at least avoided > installing C. Probably A supporters will be too unhappy, because their favorite candidate would win if B was not nominated. > > > I'm not saying that it's unarguable, nor that the voting system should > > somehow anticipate the situation (through the use of '>>', for > > example). I think it's a fuzzy case with no perfect answer, and that > > we don't really want to make the ballot more complex, or add to the > > possibilities for manipulation that such a rule would entail. I'm just > > saying that it's not obvious that, in all cases, the best rule is the > > one that lets B win. > > Choices can be hard. Get far enough from a tie and A or C will win. If > we manage a cycle we can debate the results of that. > -- > [EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek > Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 > Do to no one what you would not want done to you. > If you want peace, work for justice. > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > -- ________________________________ Diego Santos
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