On Thu, 13 Dec 2007 12:00:21 -0800 Jonathan Lundell wrote: > On Dec 13, 2007, at 9:25 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote: > >> On Thu, 13 Dec 2007 08:00:23 -0800 Jonathan Lundell wrote: >> >>> On Dec 11, 2007, at 6:17 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote: >>> >>>> A and C agree that B is better than their standard enemy. >>>> >>>> C voters will be happy to help install B, since this is better >>>> than installing A. A voters may be a bit unhappy, but they at >>>> least avoided installing C. >>>> >>> That argument makes sense after the election, once the A or C >>> voters know for certain that C or A, respectively, would have won >>> had it not been for B. But the argument fails *before* the >>> election. Given the implied utility function of this election, both >>> A and C voters have a strong incentive to bury B if they think >>> their own candidate has a good chance of winning outright. >> >> >> Later in that same post of mine: >> >>>> Choices can be hard. Get far enough from a tie and A or C will >>>> win. If we manage a cycle we can debate the results of that. >>> >> >> IF A or C expected a solid win, the same voting would have been >> appropriate, since it would not prevent the win from being recognized. >> >> Of course, there can be cycles - and hopefully the method will handle >> them well - but this does not seem to be the place to debate handling >> cycles. > > > Cycles don't enter into it (and if A is guaranteed a solid win, then of > course strategy is irrelevant). > > My argument is about expected utility. Let's go back to Diego's scenario: > > 46: A >> B > C > 5: B >> A > C > 5: B >> C > A > 44: C >> B > A > > Suppose the A voters' utility for {A, B, C} is {100, 10, 0}, and B's > likewise, mutatis mutandis; their estimated probability of A's (B's) > election must be low indeed before it's rational for them to approve B > (or to rank B in a Condorcet election). > Lets assume: B voters are going to vote as described (avoids debating how they might change). There are 90 major party voters, desperately wishing to win, but willing to let B win on near ties, rather than risking opponents winning without earning full backing. No cycles (which require full 3-way competition, while this is mostly 2-way.
The pattern above works for this: A or C may get more than 50 votes - and win. Best of A or C may be less than 50 votes, letting B take a turn as winner. A or C can get 50 (of the 90) - making a tie in A>B or C>B - have fun unless this gets resolved. Note that the pattern is neutral as to A vs C, and provides for hand-off to B on near A-C ties WITHOUT needing to estimate chances of a tie. A and C actually using it makes sense to me for: Whichever is strong on election day wins. If neither is strong then, better B than the enemy. I vote against "Random Ballot" for this task. -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info