Rob,
--- rob brown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > I can't think of any (serious) method with more straight-forward
> strategy
> > than Approval.
>
> Please elaborate. Seems to me that the optimum strategy of Approval
> involves guessing how others will vote. And guessing how others will
> vote
> involves a) guessing what their best strategy is, which of course is
> cyclical and becomes a great big hall of mirrors, and b) guessing how how
> their actual voting differs from optimum strategy, which becomes an
> exercise
> in psychology.
Well, at least once you have finished evaluating what you think may happen
(with whatever probabilities) it becomes straight-forward, as you simply
approve everyone who is better than your expectation (the average of
outcomes' utilities weighted by their odds of occurring).
I guess under Approval it is frequently of consequence to the vote you
decide on, what you think other voters will do. But I don't think the
nature of the considerations is particularly unique. Condorcet still has
the "one party with two candidates" defection issue.
Kevin Venzke
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