Rob,
--- rob brown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Anyway, as I'm sure you know, that system (rank/rate your candidates
> honestly, let the system generate the most strategic approval ballot) is
> simply DSV, and it works out to be the same as Condorcet.
How does your method resolve:
49 A
24 B>C
27 C>B
vs.
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
? May I assume a voter is allowed to bullet-vote? If not, how does your
method resolve:
40 A>B>C
35 B>C>A
25 C>A>B
?
Does your information allow rated information? It seems this should be no
problem since you would not have any incentive to exaggerate your
preferences when the method does its best to get you what you want.
Kevin Venzke
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