Hello Kevin,
these ratios are guesses I have for real elections.
But I am fed up with guesses so the goal is to build an objective method
able to
determine for a perticular set (method, ballots expressing sincere
preferences, outcome)
of one electoral data, the most satisfying method in the eye of all voters.
Stéphane
Kevin Venzke a écrit :
Hi Stéphane,
--- Stéphane Rouillon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
Again satisfaction analysis can be used to objectively determine which
of IRV and FTP
produces the best outcome. Using enough election data, one could even
measure how often IRV may
elect the candidate not favored by most voters. My humble estimation is
rarely (1/50 times).
In comparison I estimate FPTP outcomes to be deficient (1/5 times) and
condorcet methods (1/200 times).
I qualify a method to be deficient when another outcome would produce a
better global satisfaction.
To do this you would have to be clear and consistent with your
assumptions... Is "global satisfaction" the total utility (on some scale)
of the winner? When you guess that IRV fails by this standard 1/50 times,
are you considering real life elections, or random ones? If random then how
many candidates and is there any underlying policy space? etc.
Given real life elections I guess 1/50 may be accurate for IRV, but I don't
feel this tells the whole story. Strategic nomination and voting
incentives, as well as incentives created by institutions other than the
voting rule itself, would not seem to be considered at all by this measure.
Given random elections with even 3 candidates and the ability to truncate,
I guess IRV is much, much worse than 1/50.
Kevin Venzke
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