Hi Stéphane, --- Stéphane Rouillon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > Counter-example: > Lets assume ballots represent sincere ratings. > 50%: A-100 B-70 C-0 > 30%: B-100 C- 90 A-0 > 20%: C-100 A-10 B-0 > Average ratings: A-52 B-65 C-47 > Outcome: B wins > Satisfaction: 30% > A method delivering A as a winner would produce a 50% satisfaction > measure. > > I do not maximize social utility. But rather individual approbation. > I compare the global result with the optimal result according to the > voter. > The optimal result is defined as the elected representatives that would > be obtained if every other > voters with the same opportunity than the reference voter had voted like > the reference voter. > Maybe satisfaction is not the proper terminology.
Ok. Maybe you've explained this already, but how do you determine then that SNTV isn't the method that maximizes satisfaction? Or would you say that it does? Specifically it seems to me that if you just elect the top X FPP candidates in an X-seat election, you maximize the number of voters that got their favorite elected. Kevin Venzke __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? En finir avec le spam? Yahoo! Mail vous offre la meilleure protection possible contre les messages non sollicités http://mail.yahoo.fr Yahoo! Mail ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
