Kathy Dopp wrote: Kathy Dopp kathy.dopp at gmail.com Sat May 3 21:29:19 PDT 2008
"..However, even despite some voters using strategy because they realize that IRV fundamentally does not work the way it is intended to, you will undoubtedly find ample number of cases of candidates "winning" elections who were not preferred by most voters. .." Kathy, In a previous post I nit-picked an anti-IRV example you gave. Yes, it is possible for IRV to elect a candidate that is apparently not the strongest. 31: A>B 32: B>C 37: C http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2007-December/021192.html What exactly does your phrase "not preferred by most voters" mean (or refer to)? Does it just refer to IRV's failure of the Condorcet criterion? The Alternative Vote (voters strictly rank from the top however many or few candidates they wish, until one remains eliminate the remaining candidate that is top ranked among remaining candidates on the fewest ballots) has a maximal set of positive properties. Therefore to credibly attack (this version of) IRV, you might like to tell us which of it's positive properties you think are less valuable than ones you prefer and maybe give an example of a precisely defined method that you claim is better. Chris Benham Get the name you always wanted with the new y7mail email address. www.yahoo7.com.au/y7mail ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
