At 03:49 PM 7/22/2008, Juho wrote:
On Jul 22, 2008, at 14:26 , Michael Allan wrote:
What is btw the reason that there were no arrows forward from the two
leading candidates in the election snapshot picture in the references
page? Did they abstain or were their votes (not even their own vote)
not cascaded forward for some other reason?
Representing a complete proxy structure in a two-dimensional graph is
tricky. What was done, let's assume, is to not show proxy assignments
that complete loops. A more full graph would show loops, but not
those that come from what are effectively "top proxies." Consider
this a problem to work on: show a predicted mature proxy structure,
flat, two-dimensional. I would arrange the "voters" -- these aren't
really votes in the traditional sense, they are assignments of voting
rights -- in a circle, with votes who have received no proxy
assignments on the outside, and voters with maximum proxy assignments
being closest to the center of the circle. So distance from the
center varies with the number of proxies collected. At the center, a
proxy would be a superproxy, representing every member who has named
a proxy. So if we define "proxy rank," PR, as the number of voters
represented if a proxy votes and nobody else votes, then we can
define radial distance equals f(PR). I would set a minimum distance
for a superproxy, not zero. (because there can be more than one; for
example, suppose there are two proxies who collectively represent
everyone, and they each name each other. Then, in the absence of the
other, each of them represents all. Wouldn't that be a nice
outcome!!! But, remember, this is in an FA. Representing all doesn't
mean "controlling all." It merely would mean that you've got someone,
or several people, who are able to voice a broad consensus pretty
much as they see fit, with it being likely that actual voting would
confirm that.)
So, then, the position of the members in the space can be manipulated
so that the proxy assignments don't cross, graphically. Anyone
inclined to work out a chart program that would take a list of
members and a proxy table and generate the graph?
The behaviour of voter A in the example above may be quite "sincere".
He likes B. If B forwards his votes to some candidate that A
considers to be worse than C then A may vote for C directly.
Sure. This is describing delegable proxy as an election method. It's
a mistake, though, to think of it as that. Rather, think of it as
setting up a participatory, deliberative process which allows people
to vote directly or to assign their votes, over as many iterations as
it takes. I.e., standard deliberative process, election by majority
vote, say, or possibly by supermajority in some situations. As a
"voting method" (single ballot, deterministic), it's possibly
interesting but hardly satisfactory, for it suffers from the same
problems as all such methods. For starters, a majority cannot be
guaranteed unless you coerce voters (as they do with IRV and STV in Australia).
I expect the cycles in opinions to potentially cause repeated changes
in the cast votes (but since I don't know yet exactly how the voter
will be cascaded I will not attempt to describe the details yet).
Actually, what I expect is that most voters will abstain, being
content to leave decisions to their proxies, being those whom they
have come to trust as being most informed and most likely to cast the
best vote. So, in the end, an election decision will be made by a
relatively small number of individuals who are massively trusted.
It's a parliamentary system, in fact, with highly accurate
proportional representation -- of the proxy kind rather than of the
fixed seat, constant vote per seat, kind. (Asset Voting is a kind of
hybrid, when used for PR with a fixed quota and vote, but if Asset
Voting is used to create an electoral college, so to speak, with
these electors being public voters, and having the right to vote
directly on Assembly matters, as fractional votes based on the quota
and votes held, it really is both systems but with a defined
deliberative body that functions much as present bodies, only the
voting is somewhat different (and, I'd predict, in practice, direct
votes would not normally be enough to shift decisions. It's the
exceptions that are important, though, and the fact that
participation becomes full, whenever electors want that, that would
make the crucial difference in how people perceive the government.)
(I have to look at this one again in the morning.) There's
a little more detail on cycles here:
http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht#cascade-cyclic
Could you explain what happened in Figure 9? What are the rules that
keep one vote at five of the candidates (red numbers) but forward
some of the votes to the next candidate in the ring? I.e. why not
forward all votes or keep all votes?
I would "forward" all or none, in straight Delegable Proxy. Keep it
Simple. In fact, there isn't really any "vote forwarding." There is
just individuals voting as they choose. "Vote forwarding" is just a
method of determining, then, the vote value for each vote actually
cast. In an Asset scheme, however, used for PR, electors, now holding
multiple votes, would assign specific votes to specific candidates.
I've proposed that they might try to keep votes assigned in precinct
blocks, which then has the salutary effect of allowing voters to know
exactly whom their vote elected. Generally, with Asset, assigned this
way, one vote elects one seat, together with all the other votes
making up the quota. If direct voting is going to be allowed, the
quota should be the Hare quota, i.e, if there are N seats, and V
voters, the quota (which is exact, not rounded off) is V/N votes.
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