If I understand you 'sequential elimination' is IRV and not Condorcet.
DWK
On Tue, 11 Nov 2008 00:01:36 +0000 (GMT) Juho Laatu wrote:
The sequential elimination processes tends to introduce additional problems.
Most Condorcet methods don't have this problem.
Condorcet may have some other problems that the sequential elimination based
approach may avoid, but especially in large public elections with independent
voter decision making and without too accurate knowledge about the behaviour of
other voters the performance of Condorcet methods is very good.
(Just checking how one could eliminate some of the problems of sequential elimination
(e.g. by using approval and avoid losing the "eliminated" candidates).)
Juho
--- On Mon, 10/11/08, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
From: Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [email protected]
Date: Monday, 10 November, 2008, 8:10 PM
How do your thoughts compare with Condorcet as a competitor?
It:
Normally is defined as not doing runoffs.
Has no problem with voters offering whatever quantity
of ranks they choose, including doing bullet voting.
DWK
On Mon, 10 Nov 2008 16:05:16 +0000 (GMT) Juho Laatu wrote:
FYI. Finland used to have three rounds in the
presidential elections. Since 1994 a typical direct two
round method has been used. Before that (in most elections)
the voters first elected 300 (or 301) electors who then
voted in three rounds (two candidates at the last round).
Reasons behind moving to the direct two round system
included assumed general popularity of a direct election,
some problems with heavy trading and planning of votes by
the electors, possibility of black horses and other voting
patterns that are not based on the citizens' votes.
Maybe three rounds / three election days in a direct
election would have been too expensive and too tiring.
- - - - -
One somewhat related method:
I sometimes played with the idea that in IRV one would
not totally eliminate the least popular (first place)
candidates but would use some softer means and would allow
the "eliminated" candidates to win later if they
turn out to be the favourites of many voters (after their
first preference candidates have lost all chances to win).
One could e.g. force supporters of the
"eliminated" candidates to approve more than one
candidate (at least one of the "remaining"
candidates) (instead of just bullet voting their second
preference). On possible way to terminate the algorithm
would be to stop when someone has reached >50% approval
level.
Also in "non-instant" runoffs one could e.g.
force the voters to approve at least one on the
"remaining" candidates. (One could eliminate more
than one candidate at different rounds.)
Juho
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
