On Tue, 11 Nov 2008 22:18:55 +0000 (GMT) Juho Laatu wrote:
I just referred to the basic property of IRV that it makes final irreversible
decisions (eliminates candidates) before even reading the later preferences in
each ballot.
Agreed.
(Some really strong compromise candidates may be eliminated early. And on the
other hand also candidates with not much first place support may be elected.)
True that well liked candidates can lose if short on first place votes.
Possible, though difficult, to win with only a few first place votes - they
must have more than the least as each least gets discarded.
DWK
Juho
--- On Tue, 11/11/08, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
From: Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [email protected]
Date: Tuesday, 11 November, 2008, 6:43 PM
Not clear to me what you meant.
While ballots are almost identical, such that Condorcet can
accept what
voters have done by IRV rules, their processing is entirely
different.
IRV is interested in first choices. If it decides that A
is a loser it
must go back to the ballots that ranked A top and
reclassify them by next
rank of each.
Condorcet is interested in which candidate is best liked.
For this it
needs an NxN array summing all the ballots. If it is
convenient to count
the ballots in multiple locations this is fine - create an
NxN array at
each location and sum them together in one final location
for analysis.
DWK
On Tue, 11 Nov 2008 06:39:53 +0000 (GMT) Juho Laatu wrote:
Yes, IRV is a good example. Most Condorcet methods do
the comparisons/evaluation just once (when all the
candidates are in the same situation).
Juho
--- On Tue, 11/11/08, Dave Ketchum
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
From: Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [email protected]
Date: Tuesday, 11 November, 2008, 2:47 AM
If I understand you 'sequential
elimination' is IRV
and not Condorcet.
DWK
On Tue, 11 Nov 2008 00:01:36 +0000 (GMT) Juho Laatu
wrote:
The sequential elimination processes tends to
introduce additional problems. Most Condorcet
methods
don't have this problem.
Condorcet may have some other problems that the
sequential elimination based approach may avoid,
but
especially in large public elections with
independent voter
decision making and without too accurate knowledge
about the
behaviour of other voters the performance of
Condorcet
methods is very good.
(Just checking how one could eliminate some of
the
problems of sequential elimination (e.g. by using
approval
and avoid losing the "eliminated"
candidates).)
Juho
--- On Mon, 10/11/08, Dave Ketchum
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
From: Dave Ketchum
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [email protected]
Date: Monday, 10 November, 2008, 8:10 PM
How do your thoughts compare with Condorcet
as a
competitor?
It:
Normally is defined as not doing
runoffs.
Has no problem with voters offering
whatever
quantity
of ranks they choose, including doing
bullet
voting.
DWK
On Mon, 10 Nov 2008 16:05:16 +0000 (GMT)
Juho Laatu
wrote:
FYI. Finland used to have three rounds
in the
presidential elections. Since 1994 a
typical direct
two
round method has been used. Before that (in
most
elections)
the voters first elected 300 (or 301)
electors who
then
voted in three rounds (two candidates at
the last
round).
Reasons behind moving to the direct two
round
system
included assumed general popularity of a
direct
election,
some problems with heavy trading and
planning of
votes by
the electors, possibility of black horses
and other
voting
patterns that are not based on the
citizens'
votes.
Maybe three rounds / three election days in
a
direct
election would have been too expensive and
too
tiring.
- - - - -
One somewhat related method:
I sometimes played with the idea that
in IRV
one would
not totally eliminate the least popular
(first
place)
candidates but would use some softer means
and
would allow
the "eliminated" candidates to
win later
if they
turn out to be the favourites of many
voters (after
their
first preference candidates have lost all
chances
to win).
One could e.g. force supporters of the
"eliminated" candidates to
approve more
than one
candidate (at least one of the
"remaining"
candidates) (instead of just bullet voting
their
second
preference). On possible way to terminate
the
algorithm
would be to stop when someone has reached
50%
approval
level.
Also in "non-instant" runoffs
one
could e.g.
force the voters to approve at least one on
the
"remaining" candidates. (One
could
eliminate more
than one candidate at different rounds.)
Juho
--
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
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