--- On Wed, 26/11/08, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: [EM] Why the concept of "sincere" votes in Range is flawed. > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Date: Wednesday, 26 November, 2008, 7:55 AM > Hi Juho, > > --- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Juho Laatu > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > > One approach to sincerity is to compare voter > behaviour to > > the requested behaviour. In Approval if the request is > to > > mark all candidates that one approves then placing the > > cutoff between two main candidates is often > insincere.. > > Approval is a special method from this point of view > since > > it is often described as requiring the voter to plan > what is > > the best strategic vote (where to put the cutoff). > > I'm not sure that "requested behavior" is > typically defined on the > ballot.
Yes, probably not common. Also other messages from the election organizer and media and fellow voters may be vague. > It is also far from obvious to me that Approval > uniquely > requires a strategic decision. In the EM discussions people seem to assume that at least one should put the cutoff between some leading candidates. People seldom talk about marking those candidates that one approves (I have seen this approach however in some mechanically generated ballots for simulations). Don't know about real life. > You can also argue either > that FPP also > asks for a strategic decision, or else that > "approval" is supposed > to refer to a real concept. FPP (or actually some society that uses FPP) could take the stance that voters are expected to pick one of the two leading candidates in a two-party country, which would make voting sincere. Otherwise not voting for one's favourite minor candidate could be seen as an insincere strategic decision. In real life I think people generally know that one should vote strategically in FPP, so from this point of view the society expects a simple strategy (don't vote for candidates that don't have a chance) to be applied. One interesting feature is protest votes. Many vote for minor candidates although they know that their vote will be "lost" (in the usual meaning of the term that refers only to the outcome of these elections). Protest votes do have a meaning outside of this narrow interpretation (impacting the outcome of this election) though. > > You can easily deny that you have an internal concept of > "approval," > but you can also deny that you have an internal transitive > ranking > of the candidates. Maybe it's harder to believe, but it > can't be > disproven. (Though, I don't really think it is harder > to believe, > since "approval" has a plain English meaning.) It seems that voting method "Approval" has cut its ties to English term "approval" (at least at the EM list). In ranking based methods EM people seem to assume that voters have some easy to identify transitive order of the candidates in their mind (=sincere opinion). I find it revealing that there is not much discussion on the possibility to cast non-transitive votes. Such votes would be strategically more efficient than the transitive ones. Use of transitive votes seem to reflect the idea that the sincere opinion of a rational voter would always be transitive. (Well, of course casting non-transitive votes would be technically more challenging.) Juho > > Kevin Venzke > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see > http://electorama.com/em for list info ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
