Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 04:44 AM 12/28/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
[it was written:] I am satisfied that there are perfectly adequate
"vote once"
systems available for all public elections, both single-office
elections and assembly elections.
If they are good for public elections, why are they *never* used for
smaller organizations where repeated ballot is easy? Wouldn't it save
time?
Yes, advanced methods *can* save time, *if* a majority is still
required. Otherwise the result can *easily* be one that a majority
would reject. How often? Depends on the method, I'm sure, but my
estimate is that it's about one in ten for IRV in nonpartisan
elections in the U.S. It's pretty easy to show.
Wouldn't that be because you can do RRO type iteration because of the
small size?
Of course. (i.e., nobody considers using advanced methods in such
organizations when, for example, face-to-face meetings are possible and
normal for election. There are exceptions, and, I'd say, they have been
warped by outside political considerations; there is a sense among some
student organizations, for example, that by implementing IRV, they are
advancing a general progressive cause. They've been had.)
Consider the extreme, where there's just you and a few friends. There
would seem to be little point in voting when you can just all discuss
the options and reach a conclusion.
Absolutely. However, this kind of direct process indicates the
foundations of democracy. There are problems of scale as the scale
increases, but the *substance* does not intrinsically change, until not
only the scale has become large, but the culture expects alienation and
division. When the scale is small, people will take the time to resolve
deep differences, ordinarily (if they care about the cooperation being
negotiated). That cannot be done, directly, on a large scale. *However,
it can be done through a system that creates networks of connection.*
These networks are what we actually need, and not only is it unnecessary
to change laws to get them, it actually would be a mistake to try to
legislate it. If it's subject to law, it is subject to control and
corruption. It would be like the State telling small groups how they
should come to agreement!
I would say that the problem is not just that culture expects
alienation, but that a full on "everybody discusses with everybody else"
scales very poorly (worst case quadratic) so that the common opinion
never converges, or converges very slowly. This is somewhat related to
Parkinson's coefficient of inefficiency - as the number of members in a
committe grows, subgroups form and there's no longer direct discussion.
The networks of connections would presumably make groups that readjust
and form in different configurations according to the political
positions of the people - like water, hence *Liquid* Democracy. I think
vote buying would be a problem with that concept, though, because if the
network of connections is public, then those who want to influence the
system can easily check whether the members are upholding their ends of
the "bargain" (votes for money).
Perhaps there would be if you just can't reach an agreement ("okay,
this has gone long enough, let's vote and get this over with").
Absolutely. And this happens all the time with direct democratic
process. And those who have participated in it much usually don't take
losing all that seriously, provided the rules have been followed. Under
Robert's Rules, it takes a two-thirds majority to close debate and vote.
Common respect usually allows all interested parties to speak before the
question is called.
However, it takes a majority to decide a question, period, any question,
not just an election. That's the bottom line for democracy. Taking less
may *usually* work well enough, but it's risky. It can tear an
organization apart, under some circumstances. That's why election by
plurality is strongly discouraged in Robert's Rules.
Given the above, maybe advanced methods would have their place as
figurative tiebreakers when one can't reach a majority by other means.
Say that the discussion/meeting goes on for a long time, and a
supermajority decides it's been long enough. If there are multiple
proposals, one could then have an election among those (law, no law, law
with amendment, law without rider, whatever). If there is no method
that's good enough to provide the majority certification you seek, there
could be a runoff afterwards - but I'll note that a runoff doesn't
magically produce majority support, since if one of the runoff
candidates/options is bad, most would obviously align themselves with
the other. The Le Pen situation would be a good example of that. Just
because Chirac got 82%, that doesn't mean that Chirac is best, just that
he's best in that one-on-one comparison.
In short, you'd have something like: for very small groups, the cost
of involving a voting method is too high compared to the benefits. For
intermediate groups, iteration works. For large groups, voting is the
right thing to do, because iteration is expensive and may in any event
lead to cycling because people can't just share the nuances of their
positions with a thousand others, hive-mind style.
Right. However, there is Range Voting, which simulates negotiation,
actually. If there are stages in it, it more accurately simulates
negotiation. There are hybrid methods which address most of the concerns
that I've seen raised. However, having two possible ballots taken rather
than one is a *huge* step toward simulation of direct process, so large
that I'd be reluctant to replace TTR with Range, unless it becomes
Range/runoff. Robert's Rules notes as another problem with the
preferential method they describe that voters cannot base their votes in
subsequent process on the results of the first election.
You say that Range simulates negotiation (because people vote according
to VNM utilities and all that). If that's true, why do we need a runoff?
Is it because you want a true majority?
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