At 12:55 PM 12/30/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
However, consider this: the Plurality voting system (FPTP)
encourages compromise already. There would have been more sincere
first preference votes. My guess, though, is that the use of, say,
Bucklin, would have resulted in *at least* half of those
pluralities becoming a majority, possibly more. However, this is
the real effect of the system described:
In maybe one election out of 10, were it top two runoff, the result
would shift, which, I contend, is clearly a more democratic result.
There might be a slightly increased improvement if the primary
method weren't top two Plurality, majority win, but a method which
would find a Condorcet winner or at least include that winner in a
runoff. How much is it worth to improve the result -- it could be a
very significant improvement -- in 10% of elections?
I'd say it's worth a lot!
I'd also say that even if you had a magic "best utility"
single-winner method, it wouldn't be the right method to use in a
parliamentary context. If a majority of the voters agree with some
position (and we discard gerrymander-type effects, intentional or
not), then the parliament will agree with that position,
unanimously. Hence... PR is needed.
I was considering single-winner context. Yes. For representation,
single-winner is, almost guaranteed, a nondemocratic proposition. If
I have to contend with you to determine who represents the two of us,
it can't be said that whoever wins actually represents us both. Only
if I can choose my representative can I be truly said to be represented fairly.
STV methods approach this, but Asset simply does it. I choose the
"candidate" I most trust, there isn't any reason to vote for anyone
else. I can, perhaps, even register as an elector-candidate and vote
for myself, if I'm willing to go to the trouble of participating in
further process.
And then this person will either end up representing me in the
assembly, or will, again, choose the person who does end up in the assembly.
In an Asset system, it may not be necessary that the votes be "passed
on," as in a delegable proxy system. Rather, the electors would
negotiate, and when enough of them agree with each other on the
identity of the seat, they register the required quota of votes and
it is done. I've been recommending the Hare quota, not the Droop
quota, because it is theoretically possible that all the votes would
be used; the Droop quota assumes wasted votes.
Further, because I'm looking to the possibility that electors might
be able to vote directly in the Assembly, the voting power of the
seats is equal to the summed voting power of the votes transferred by
the supporting electors to the seat. Because it's very likely that
*some* votes will be wasted, i.e., won't create a seat, for some
reason or other, I'd rather aim for a number of seats but tolerate
that normally, there would be a vacancy. There might be even more
than one! If the electors can vote directly, they actually don't lose
that much if they are unable to elect a seat. If they can vote by
proxy, it's almost as good! -- but they wouldn't have deliberative
rights, just voting rights.
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