On Mon, 26 Jan 2009 17:59:56 -0500 Michael Allan wrote:
By a voting system "of the public sphere", I mean...


Dave Ketchum wrote:


I do not see voters getting a choice.  Whoever has power or
authority sets up the system.  Voters, at most, can choose whether
to participate and/or complain.


  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_sphere

Thanks for this. I did a search on "vot" and am convinced voting is not one of their topics - and suspect you stretched to tie it in.

We're using different definitions.  There's no power or authority to
speak of in the public sphere.  Consider this analogy with another
another domain in the public sphere - that of the press:

           voter  =  journalist

  voting systems  =  broadcast media + Weblog software

   secret ballot  =  anonymous authorship

Consider enforcing anonymity on all press systems (type 1), such that
journalists can no longer attach their names to news articles.  You
see, it is impossible.  There is going to be a mix of types, and in
fact it is:

 1. Economist, etc.
 2. Weblogs, many smaller newspapers, etc.
 3. New York Times, etc.

Type 2 predominates, meaning the journalist decides whether to reveal
her identity.  In any case, journalists have the choice of where to
post their articles, and are always free to start their own papers,
Weblogs, etc.

Likewise for voting systems in the public sphere.  The state cannot
enforce a pure type 1 (secret ballot) system.  Voters will choose
which system to vote in, and thus choose their own level and mix of
restrictions.  (Aside - it follows that we're building these systems
exclusively for the convenience of voters, and we should expect a
radical departure in designs.)

I see now you're not offering secrecy. Seems to me it should not be offered unless whoever is offering is attempting to actually deliver. Thus, while a voter might assert to having voted as stated, secrecy would forbid proving this.

I start below with a couple examples of true type 1 secrecy. This has serious need, though other methods with the ability can be managed with MUCH care as to details.


Agreed, but only for voting systems on the government/administrative
side - as usually discussed in this list.  (This thread is mostly not
about those.)


The society [club] can give up on the secrecy if its members agree
that there is no value in the secrecy (they must have seen need or
they would never have invested the effort).


Agreed, but this differs from an individual member having choice of
secret|open for a particular vote, and from a choice of which system
to cast the vote in.  These differences distinguish an administrative
voting system (in the club), from the voting systems of the public
sphere (outside the club).

Again, the voter does not control secrecy. Whoever is controlling the method of voting should not claim secrecy unless doing their best to provide as claimed.

Proxies?  There is need for a verifiable record as to how many votes a
proxy can cast.

etc...

My point was that if the proxy claims to have 14 votes, self plus permission by 13 voters must be provable.


I see... The verification process rests on proving the individual
votes of each voter (including the delegates).  Then all the rest -
the flow of 13 additional votes through the delegate, and the overall
flow in the cascade - follows from the individual votes.  Does this
answer?  Or are you interested in technical details of proving the
individual votes?

The proxy claims, and needs to be able to prove, authority to vote as if 14 voters.

Could be the authority includes some direction as to how to vote - my point is that the proxy could simply be trusted to vote in the permission giver's interest.
--
 da...@clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
 Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
           Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                 If you want peace, work for justice.



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