Hi, I reread this part:
--- En date de : Dim 30.8.09, Kevin Venzke <[email protected]> a écrit : > > Ouch. That passage is obviously unclear. I meant > > "strategy" in the sense of "declared > > strategy". I was not considering any strategy at all > > from the actual voters on the ballots they would input > to > > Score DSV, but virtual "declared" strategy on the > > output (imaginary) renormalized ballots, which are > intended > > to be equivalent to (the probabilistic average of) > their > > strategic Range ballots if their input ballots are > honest > > and if they knew the true Smith set but nothing else. > In > > other words: if there is a condorcet winner, the > correct > > Range strategy for those who know that winner (and > nothing > > else) is to vote approval-style for that person and > all > > better candidates, thus Score DSV chooses the CW. It > is a > > Condorcet method, even though it does not satisfy the > Smith > > criterion (if there is no CW, it could potentially > elect the > > condorcet loser, if that candidate had a high > renormalized > > utility). When I try again, to understand strategy as something the method is doing by itself, I see that you want to explain why the CW always wins, not explain how voters can guarantee that he wins. I think there's an odd assumption in the method's logic though: What if the CW is my last choice? It's not obvious that I should start giving him votes. Really, when there is only one choice left, my best strategy is to stay home! Kevin Venzke ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
