At 03:04 AM 1/26/2010, Juho wrote:
On Jan 26, 2010, at 4:43 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 07:22 PM 1/25/2010, Juho wrote:
There are many (working) uses for an approval cutoff in ranked
ballots. But on the other hand they may add complexity and confusion
and not add anything essential. => Careful consideration needed.
Only a voting systems theorist who is not a parliamentarian or
familiar with the principles of parliamentary traditions, essential
in direct democracy, would think approval not relevant. Approval is
Yes/No on the series of possible choices. It's fundamental,
actually, and compromises with this are *never* made in direct
democracies, they are only made in the name of efficiency in large-
scale elections.
I referred only to approval cutoffs as additional components in
existing methods.
My point is that "approval" is a separate issue from ranking, and
it's actually a crucial issue in multiple-choice decision-making in
general. I've seen, after an approval poll in a context where the
first preference of most members was about 70% for one option, but an
approval polls showed little more than that as approval for that
option, but 99% approval for an alternative, a motion to adopt the
alternative, seconded and passed with no dissent at all, unanimity.
The only way to discover a situation like this is some later poll,
repeated election. Had the original poll been an actual election,
choosing the highest approval would have, in fact, implemented the
will of the majority. Usually. That's why approval voting is
reasonable, but also why runoff elections or similar tests are
sometimes needed. Note that, in a situation where they already knew
(this was show-of-hands voting, and the status quo voting was first)
that they had a strong majority, the 70% nevertheless approved also
the alternative, probably based on the thorough discussion that had
preceded the poll. They understood the depth of feeling behind the
opposition to the status quo, and, seeking the common welfare, which
depends on organizational unity, they allowed the other option to
prevail by approving it as well.
In repeated polling, approval is an excellent way to rapidly seek a
majority; in contentious issues without adequate deliberation, such
polls may start out as largely bullet-voted, but as the process
continues, approvals will be added, and some prior approvals might be
dropped (representing an actual change in preference order, a
phenomenon possible in repeated elections and obviously impossible
with a single-ballot. In the situation I described, many of those
preferring the status quo -- which had stood for maybe forty years --
had said, at first, "over my dead body." I'd call that strong
disapproval, eh? But, after discussion and expression of many
different member sentiments, those members obviously changed their minds.)
Yes. However, "designed to elect candidates with no core support" is
an overstatement. It certainly is not designed for that, but it
allows it. It's pretty unlikely, eh?
Yes, but desirable if one wants to respect the basic philosophy of sum
of ratings.
Right. Setting aside the issue of using averages, which I consider
foolish as a practical proposal at this time, but which, when we get
real Range elections happening, sum of votes obviously maximizes
expressed expected satisfaction with the various outcomes. Range
voting is interesting precisely because it bases outcomes on a metric
for election performance, and the only issue is a lot of hot air
about "strategic voting" in Range.
My view on this is simple: strategic voting in Range expresses real
preference strength. In other words, it's an oxymoron, created by an
assumption that when a voter "exaggerates," the voter doesn't really
care that much. But how much we care always depends on our perception
of realities.
If a range outcome benefits me to the tune of $100, and another costs
me $100, other things being equal, what's my preference strength
between these. We can assign an absolute value ($200) to the
preference strength, but that does not determine a sensible Range
vote. If those are the only two options, the vote strength I will
exercise is 100% between them. But say there are two more options,
but all of them are considered by me to be impossible, the other
voters won't support them. Suppose with one of these options, I gain
$1000, and with another, I lose $1000. Does this change my "sincere vote"?
I say no. But with unlimited Range, sure, I'd honestly state the
actual utilities, as long as the analysis made sense (as with a
Clarke tax). With normalized range, which is what we ordinarily see,
I will express, reasonably, my utilities within a truncated set,
where unrealistic alternatives are excluded. I have called this
"magnification," because a "sincere vote" represents only the
spectrum including realistic candidates. Which then indicates, with
Approval, an obvious and oft-suggested strategy.
This was studied by Dhillon and Mertens in their paper, Rational
Utilitarianism, and they show that with this voting strategy (more
precisely stated as voting von Neumann-Morganstern utilities), Range
Voting (including Approval) satisfies a set of Arrovian criteria that
are reasonable modifications that allow for the consideration of
expressed preference strength and equal ranking and, perhaps, I'm not
sure, a better IIA definition. More than that, it's a unique
solution. The math is complex and difficult, I'd say, Warren Smith
claims that the article uses "notation from Hell." But, to my
knowledge, no errors have been found in the paper.
There is no good definition of core support. It is quite possible that
there are elections where core support or weight on first preferences
is a desirable feature.
It could be argued that whenever "core support" exceeds 50%, this is
a proper use. With some methods, it's possible to detect that there
could be a better winner, but a candidate with core support like that
should never be unconditionally rejected, that's my position. To
reject the candidate requires a runoff that accomplishes this, explicitly.
But it is hard to discuss and judge as long as
that feature is not well specified (I don't consider the operational
definition as derived from how IRV works to be a proper definition).
The definition from FairVote is preposterous, in fact, for any
practical use. It is designed to deflect criticism of IRV, which
passes the definition, but which substantially fails core support
with a reasonable definition involving more than zero votes in first
preference, while maintaining the criticism of other methods, which
properly give one vote the strength of one vote!
If we are considering a compromise winner that will substantially
unite the electorate, and that winner turns on one vote in first
preference, is this any different, in substance, from zero votes in
first preference? Where does a realistic core support criterion come
into effect?
And, then, how desirable is core support, actually. If we have a
seriously polarized electorate, evenly divided between left and
right, and perhaps even separated as to preference strength (i.e.,
there are no voters in some middle segement), we will see core
support making this a hotly contested election, and no result is
really satisfactory; whatever happens, half the electorate will be
substantially dissatisfied.
But now add to this a centrist. By the terms, there are no voters in
the middle segment, no voters who will prefer the centrist. (In
reality, of course, there is the candidate himself and his mother....
i.e., it will never be zero in any real election.)
Why, pray tell, is the centrist a poor outcome for the election --
and criterion failure implies a poor outcome? It's a result which
could avoid a civil war or massive civil disobedience. As described,
the centrist will be the sincere second preference of all the voters.
Some voters will truncate, being the outliers in each wing, who will
still have strong preference against the centrist, but others will be
closer to the middle, and will express the preference.
But in first preference, the centrist is dead in the water, and will
be rejected in top-two runoff and in IRV, the same. Only in methods
like Bucklin or Range does the centrist have a chance, and surely
that's deserved. So Bucklin/Runoff would quite likely result in the
centrist being in the top two, plus the most popular of the extremist
frontrunners. If not, here is why: the strong majority of voters
don't want a compromise, they want a battle between the two sides,
and when two matched sides both believe they can win a battle, all
they have to do is try hard enough, expect a battle. If the issues
involved are the kind people are willing to die for -- and kill for
-- there will be a lot of dead people.
And when that is the situation, my advice is leave the country, as
quickly as you can, because it is rapidly getting very dangerous. The
problem won't be fixed by mere voting systems. If you adhere to one
of the sides, you won't listen to this advice, and if you don't,
well, by the definition of the problem, you don't exist, but maybe
there are a handful who can be saved. Return only when the sides have
learned that if they don't talk to each other, and actually and
positively seek reasonable compromises, they will both lose.
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