On Jan 26, 2010, at 8:44 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 03:04 AM 1/26/2010, Juho wrote:
On Jan 26, 2010, at 4:43 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 07:22 PM 1/25/2010, Juho wrote:
There are many (working) uses for an approval cutoff in ranked
ballots. But on the other hand they may add complexity and
confusion
and not add anything essential. => Careful consideration needed.
Only a voting systems theorist who is not a parliamentarian or
familiar with the principles of parliamentary traditions, essential
in direct democracy, would think approval not relevant. Approval is
Yes/No on the series of possible choices. It's fundamental,
actually, and compromises with this are *never* made in direct
democracies, they are only made in the name of efficiency in
large- scale elections.
I referred only to approval cutoffs as additional components in
existing methods.
My point is that "approval" is a separate issue from ranking, and
it's actually a crucial issue in multiple-choice decision-making in
general. I've seen, after an approval poll in a context where the
first preference of most members was about 70% for one option, but
an approval polls showed little more than that as approval for that
option, but 99% approval for an alternative, a motion to adopt the
alternative, seconded and passed with no dissent at all, unanimity.
The only way to discover a situation like this is some later poll,
repeated election. Had the original poll been an actual election,
choosing the highest approval would have, in fact, implemented the
will of the majority. Usually. That's why approval voting is
reasonable, but also why runoff elections or similar tests are
sometimes needed. Note that, in a situation where they already knew
(this was show-of-hands voting, and the status quo voting was first)
that they had a strong majority, the 70% nevertheless approved also
the alternative, probably based on the thorough discussion that had
preceded the poll. They understood the depth of feeling behind the
opposition to the status quo, and, seeking the common welfare, which
depends on organizational unity, they allowed the other option to
prevail by approving it as well.
In repeated polling, approval is an excellent way to rapidly seek a
majority; in contentious issues without adequate deliberation, such
polls may start out as largely bullet-voted, but as the process
continues, approvals will be added, and some prior approvals might
be dropped (representing an actual change in preference order, a
phenomenon possible in repeated elections and obviously impossible
with a single-ballot. In the situation I described, many of those
preferring the status quo -- which had stood for maybe forty years
-- had said, at first, "over my dead body." I'd call that strong
disapproval, eh? But, after discussion and expression of many
different member sentiments, those members obviously changed their
minds.)
The scenario that you described requires some goodwill among the
voters. If the competition is really strong then one could expect the
70% of the voters not to even mention the 99% approved candidate in
the polls if they already know that they have 70% majority behind
their first preference.
On the other hand the availability of reliable poll information may
reduce the competitive spirit of the election. Some part of strategic
voting and strong competitiveness is based on the fear of unknown and
lack of understanding of the viewpoints of the others. If all take a
defensive attitude from the start and paint all their competitors with
dark colours then there may never be any consensus. In typical
political environments good poll information including approvals and
ratings is thus a positive thing, but it may still be necessary to
assume that strong competition is not uncommon in the actual election
and prepare for that.
Voters may also understand that a society that makes consensus
decisions may be a better place to live in than a society where the
current majority always ignores the minorities. And people may vote
for parties that support this approach. But also here, it may still be
wise to allow the majority to decide when consensus decisions (that
cover also the needs of the other side) will be made. In a way we are
talking about a "benevolent majority" and the growth of a society
towards away from a conflict driven mode.
Yes. However, "designed to elect candidates with no core support" is
an overstatement. It certainly is not designed for that, but it
allows it. It's pretty unlikely, eh?
Yes, but desirable if one wants to respect the basic philosophy of
sum
of ratings.
Right. Setting aside the issue of using averages, which I consider
foolish as a practical proposal at this time, but which, when we get
real Range elections happening, sum of votes obviously maximizes
expressed expected satisfaction with the various outcomes. Range
voting is interesting precisely because it bases outcomes on a
metric for election performance, and the only issue is a lot of hot
air about "strategic voting" in Range.
Yes, the good part of Range is in the satisfaction measurements. I
think the strategy problems are very real in many environments, not
just hot air. So one must be careful with Range.
My view on this is simple: strategic voting in Range expresses real
preference strength. In other words, it's an oxymoron, created by an
assumption that when a voter "exaggerates," the voter doesn't really
care that much. But how much we care always depends on our
perception of realities.
If a range outcome benefits me to the tune of $100, and another
costs me $100, other things being equal, what's my preference
strength between these. We can assign an absolute value ($200) to
the preference strength, but that does not determine a sensible
Range vote. If those are the only two options, the vote strength I
will exercise is 100% between them. But say there are two more
options, but all of them are considered by me to be impossible, the
other voters won't support them. Suppose with one of these options,
I gain $1000, and with another, I lose $1000. Does this change my
"sincere vote"?
I say no. But with unlimited Range, sure, I'd honestly state the
actual utilities, as long as the analysis made sense (as with a
Clarke tax). With normalized range, which is what we ordinarily see,
I will express, reasonably, my utilities within a truncated set,
where unrealistic alternatives are excluded. I have called this
"magnification," because a "sincere vote" represents only the
spectrum including realistic candidates. Which then indicates, with
Approval, an obvious and oft-suggested strategy.
This was studied by Dhillon and Mertens in their paper, Rational
Utilitarianism, and they show that with this voting strategy (more
precisely stated as voting von Neumann-Morganstern utilities), Range
Voting (including Approval) satisfies a set of Arrovian criteria
that are reasonable modifications that allow for the consideration
of expressed preference strength and equal ranking and, perhaps, I'm
not sure, a better IIA definition. More than that, it's a unique
solution. The math is complex and difficult, I'd say, Warren Smith
claims that the article uses "notation from Hell." But, to my
knowledge, no errors have been found in the paper.
There is no good definition of core support. It is quite possible
that
there are elections where core support or weight on first preferences
is a desirable feature.
It could be argued that whenever "core support" exceeds 50%, this is
a proper use. With some methods, it's possible to detect that there
could be a better winner, but a candidate with core support like
that should never be unconditionally rejected, that's my position.
To reject the candidate requires a runoff that accomplishes this,
explicitly.
But it is hard to discuss and judge as long as
that feature is not well specified (I don't consider the operational
definition as derived from how IRV works to be a proper definition).
The definition from FairVote is preposterous, in fact, for any
practical use. It is designed to deflect criticism of IRV, which
passes the definition, but which substantially fails core support
with a reasonable definition involving more than zero votes in first
preference, while maintaining the criticism of other methods, which
properly give one vote the strength of one vote!
It is quite common that campaigns for some cause try to find positive
expressions on matters that they promote and less positive ones on
matters that they do not want to promote. Also many other campaigns do
the same. There can be of course different levels of fairness,
misleading statements, cleverly tailored sentences etc.
If we are considering a compromise winner that will substantially
unite the electorate, and that winner turns on one vote in first
preference, is this any different, in substance, from zero votes in
first preference? Where does a realistic core support criterion come
into effect?
I haven't yet seen any good definition of a core support requirement.
(In two-party countries there may be a good correlation with "the
system as it is today". It is also an interesting question if the core
support requirement is related to the intent of letting that single
elected candidate or party take all power and rule alone vs. in co-
operation with others.)
I also note that having lots of second (and third) preference support
typically correlates strongly with having also reasonable amount of
first preference support.
And, then, how desirable is core support, actually. If we have a
seriously polarized electorate, evenly divided between left and
right, and perhaps even separated as to preference strength (i.e.,
there are no voters in some middle segement), we will see core
support making this a hotly contested election, and no result is
really satisfactory; whatever happens, half the electorate will be
substantially dissatisfied.
But now add to this a centrist. By the terms, there are no voters in
the middle segment, no voters who will prefer the centrist. (In
reality, of course, there is the candidate himself and his
mother.... i.e., it will never be zero in any real election.)
Why, pray tell, is the centrist a poor outcome for the election --
and criterion failure implies a poor outcome? It's a result which
could avoid a civil war or massive civil disobedience. As described,
the centrist will be the sincere second preference of all the
voters. Some voters will truncate, being the outliers in each wing,
who will still have strong preference against the centrist, but
others will be closer to the middle, and will express the preference.
But in first preference, the centrist is dead in the water, and will
be rejected in top-two runoff and in IRV, the same. Only in methods
like Bucklin or Range does the centrist have a chance
Surely Condorcet too.
, and surely that's deserved. So Bucklin/Runoff would quite likely
result in the centrist being in the top two, plus the most popular
of the extremist frontrunners. If not, here is why: the strong
majority of voters don't want a compromise, they want a battle
between the two sides, and when two matched sides both believe they
can win a battle, all they have to do is try hard enough, expect a
battle. If the issues involved are the kind people are willing to
die for -- and kill for -- there will be a lot of dead people.
And when that is the situation, my advice is leave the country, as
quickly as you can, because it is rapidly getting very dangerous.
The problem won't be fixed by mere voting systems. If you adhere to
one of the sides, you won't listen to this advice, and if you don't,
well, by the definition of the problem, you don't exist, but maybe
there are a handful who can be saved. Return only when the sides
have learned that if they don't talk to each other, and actually and
positively seek reasonable compromises, they will both lose.
There is a natural incentive to the two largest groupings to promote
this kind of polarization. And a two-party system is a demonstration
that such systems may also work reasonably well in practice.
Juho
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