Kathy Dopp wrote:
Would that system still be additive like SAV is? Not sure how you
obtain the satisfaction scores for each possible group of winning
candidates or candidate satisfaction scores from voters' satisfaction
scores.
No, it wouldn't be.
As for how the satisfaction scores are determined: first define a
function f, s.th. f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1, f(2) = 1 + 1/2, f(3) = 1 + 1/2 +
1/3, etc.
Then, for some given candidate council, each voter v contributes f(q_v)
points where q_v is the cardinality of the intersection of the
candidates that voter approved, and the candidates in the council in
question.
Sum up these scores for all voters. The council (outcome) which would
maximize the sum, wins.
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