> > 1. Re: Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional > Representation Electoral Method (Abd ul-Rahman Lomax)
> Date: Fri, 21 May 2010 13:23:38 -0400 > From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[email protected]> > To: Jameson Quinn <[email protected]>,Raph Frank > <[email protected]> > Cc: election-methods <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional > Representation Electoral Method > Message-ID: <[email protected]> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed > > At 02:05 PM 5/20/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote: >>I was talking about SPA, not SAV. SPA (summable proportional >>approval) is a summable method which, with very high probability, >>corresponds to Sequential Proportional Approval, first proposed by >>Thiele (c.1890). This in turn corresponds, with high probability, to >>the following simple procedure, which I think is easy enough for >>anybody to understand: >> >>1. Collect approval ballots >>2. Count the ballots and elect the approval winner >>3. Select a droop quota of ballots which approve the approval winner >>and discard them. First discard ballots which only approve >>already-elected candidates; then randomly select the rest. If there >>are not enough ballots, discard all available. >>4. If the council is not full, repeat from step 2. > > Yeah, and to avoid the random selection problem, which could wreak > havoc with auditing, you'd keep all the ballots and just devalue them > proportionally to give them the proper remaining vote strength. I.e., > if there are N ballots, with quota Q, the ballots would now be worth > (N-Q)/N, but not less than zero. > > That's more complicated, to be sure, it requires maintaining sets of > devalued ballots. This could be done centrally, in fact, by > categorizing ballots into vote combinations, but that's also a lot of > data to transmit. Ultimately, with computers for analysis, and public > ballot data -- another reform I'm very interested in -- the analysis > could be done easily. I like this one because although it has some of the same flaws as STV/IRV -- having to track all the possible ballot choices cast in each precinct to make it precinct-summable -- it requires tracking far fewer unique choices since candidate order does not matter, and the method is fair and equitable because there are no elimination/redistributions of the votes ranking lowest-scoring candidates highest, so it seems like it eliminates the nonmonotonicity and non-majoritarian features of STV/IRV. > > Asset has other values that would make it superior, with what is now > being called SAV to determine the votes held by the candidates. SAV > woudl determine winners but only those who win with a direct quota. I > called it FAAV, Fractional Approval Asset Voting. I think asset voting might be very difficult to implement in practice for the candidates, although it is interesting. Kathy. > > With Asset, the fractional approval does not create a problem with > voting power, it's safe to vote with complete sincerity, and > vote-for-one works fine. In fact, I only suggest fractional approval > to avoid discarding ballots, and because some people object to the > idea of transferring all their voting power to one person, though, in > fact, that's what's going to happen in the Assembly! > > (Unless this becomes direct/asset democracy, which allows the > "electors" to continue to exercise voting power when they so choose, > seats are only elected for representation in deliberation and default > voting power.) > > -- Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 "One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts." Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf Voters Have Reason to Worry http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf View my research on my SSRN Author page: http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
