On Thu, May 20, 2010 at 11:35 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[email protected]> wrote: > Kathy Dopp wrote: >> >> Would that system still be additive like SAV is? Not sure how you >> obtain the satisfaction scores for each possible group of winning >> candidates or candidate satisfaction scores from voters' satisfaction >> scores. > > No, it wouldn't be. > > As for how the satisfaction scores are determined: first define a function > f, s.th. f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1, f(2) = 1 + 1/2, f(3) = 1 + 1/2 + 1/3, etc. > > Then, for some given candidate council, each voter v contributes f(q_v) > points where q_v is the cardinality of the intersection of the candidates > that voter approved, and the candidates in the council in question. > > Sum up these scores for all voters. The council (outcome) which would > maximize the sum, wins.
So the system would be additive only from the sense of precinct sums for each of the possible unique council subsets? So if it were an 4 member council being elected (or four seats in a council) and there were 10 candidates, how many precinct sums would there have to be? I think you'd have to publish all the individual ballots of all the voters to make that one auditable, just like with IRV/STV, right? > -- Kathy Dopp http://electionmathematics.org Town of Colonie, NY 12304 "One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the discussion with true facts." Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf Voters Have Reason to Worry http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf View my research on my SSRN Author page: http://ssrn.com/author=1451051 ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
