On Jun 16, 2010, at 1:30 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all, dear Markus Schulze,
I got a second question from one of our members (actually the same
guy which asked for the first time):
If I just bullet vote in a Condorcet election, then I increase the
chances of my candidate being elected?
If there is a Condorcet Winner (CW), the answer is "no". If there is
no CW, then we have a "Condorcet paradox" or a "cycle" where Candidate
Rock beats Candidate Scissors, Candidate Scissors beats Candidate
Paper, and Candidate Paper beats Candidate Rock. Then I won't say
whether the answer is "no" for sure, but I am still convinced that
cycles are rare and that a method like Schulze or Ranked Pairs
resolves the cycles meaningfully.
If I have a second or third option, the chances of my prefered
candidate to win is lowered?
Same answer as above. If there is a CW, the answer is "no, it does
not hurt your favorite. It makes no difference to your favorite."
Q: In this case why should any voter not bullet-vote?
The whole idea is to allow the voter expressivity in all election
possibilities and to not burden the voter with the need to think or
vote strategically. If the voter thinks that Candidate A is a better
choice than Candidate B (that is, if the election was a 2-person race
between A and B, this voter would vote for A), then the voter ranks A
above B and that's that. Nothing more to worry about. If the voter
would vote for Candidate C over B in a 2-person race but not over A in
a different 2-person race, then that voter would rank A highest, C
next, followed by B last. Bullet voting for A does not help A any
more than ranking A highest and mutes this voter regarding a possible
decision between B and C.
I have some clue on how to answer, but not enough for an exhaustive
answer.
My argument starts:
If I vote for a candidate who has >50% of the votes, then it does
not matter if there is a second or third choice.
If my prefered candidate A gets <50% of the votes, then it makes
sense to support a second choice candidate B.
However if the supporters of B only bullet vote, then maybe B's
supporters get an advantage over A?
No, not if either A or B (or C) end up as the Condorcet Winner.
... at this point I realize, that I don't know enough about
Condorcet and/or Schulze to answer the question.
Why is it not rational to bullet vote in a Condorcet election if you
are allowed not to rank some candidates?
Because you lose your voice in a potentially decisive election between
two candidates, neither whom are your favorite but one of them you hate.
I guess you have discussed this question a zillion of times, so
please forgive my ignorance.
It's what it's all about. According to my "Gospel of Fair Elections
according to Condorcet", there are really no downsides if there is a
clear Condorcet Winner (and I disagree with most of the rest of this
mailing list about the "Dark Horse pathology"). And I believe that
cycles (where there *is* no CW) are rare. That's my religion.
--
r b-j [email protected]
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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