robert bristow-johnson wrote:
but if cycles are *not* involved (at all, going into a cycle from a sincere CW or coming out of one), i would be interested in you showing us how a strategy, such as Bullet Voting, can change the CW from someone you didn't support to someone you do support.
To my knowledge, when there is a CW and your vote doesn't induce a cycle, Condorcet methods pass LNHarm and LNHelp. The only way a candidate can directly become a CW is if you rank him above the old CW and vice versa. Thus, truncation doesn't help your candidate. Either he wins by being ranked above the old CW, in which case he would have won with a full vote, or he doesn't, in which case he wouldn't. The only thing a full ranking does is increase the possibility that your vote will pull the winner away from the old CW towards someone you like better than him but not as well as the favorite. However, Condorcet methods pay for this criterion compliance within the acyclical domain by introducing inevitable discontinuities between it and the cyclical domain. The Condorcet criterion itself is incompatible with the LNH* criteria: always electing the Condorcet winner means there will always be transition cases (not the same for every Condorcet method) where submitting a sincere ranking will pull the method outcome across the divide and lead to an undesired result. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
