On May 28, 2011, at 3:41 PM, S Sosnick wrote:
On 27-May-2011, Jameson Quinn, wrote, "I agree [with Juho Laatu].
If minimax is twice as likely
to be adopted, because it's simpler, and gives >95% of the advantage
vs. plurality of the
theoretically-best Condorcet methods, then it *is* the best. And
besides, if we try to get
consensus on which is the absolutely best completion method, then
almost by
definition, we're going to end up arguing in circles (cycles?)."
I also agree. More noteworthy, however, is that Nicolaus Tideman
does, too. At page 242 of
"Collective Decisions and Voting" (2006), he says, "If voters and
vote counters have only a slight
tolerance for complexity, the maximin rule is the one they would
reasonably choose."
will minimax of margins decide differently than ranked pairs? if the
cycle has only three candidates, it seems to me that it must be
equivalent to ranked pairs.
is there any good reason to use minimax of winning votes (clipped at
zero) over minimax using margins? it seems to me that a candidate
pairing where Candidate A just squeaks by Candidate B, but where a
lotta people vote should have less weight than a pairing where one
candidate creams the other, but fewer voters weighed in on it.
--
r b-j [email protected]
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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