S Sosnick wrote:
On 27-May-2011, Jameson Quinn, wrote, "I agree [with Juho Laatu]. If minimax is twice as likely
to be adopted, because it's simpler, and gives >95% of the advantage vs. plurality of the
theoretically-best Condorcet methods, then it *is* the best. And besides, if we try to get
consensus on which is the absolutely best completion method, then almost by
definition, we're going to end up arguing in circles (cycles?)."
I also agree. More noteworthy, however, is that Nicolaus Tideman does, too. At page 242 of
"Collective Decisions and Voting" (2006), he says, "If voters and vote counters have only a slight
tolerance for complexity, the maximin rule is the one they would reasonably choose."
Wouldn't that title more likely go to Copeland? It's simple (count
number of matches won x2 plus number of matches tied), is already used
in sports, and (at least here) the sports application has a tiebreaker,
too (basically, sum margins of defeats).
Copeland also always elects from the Smith set, and possibly even the
uncovered set. It isn't cloneproof, but neither is Minmax. I suppose
Minmax is more strategy-resistant, though.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
