I agree with Kevin. Winning Votes is much better and easier to defend. But I still think that we should go with a method that is does not require the voters to rank the candidates.
>From simplest to less simple but still simple enough: 1. Asset Voting 2. Approval 3. DYN 4. MCA 5. The Bucklin Variant of Venzke and Benham > From: Kevin Venzke > To: robert bristow-johnson > Cc: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [EM] Remember Toby > Message-ID: <[email protected]> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 > > Hi Robert, > > --- En date de?: Sam 28.5.11, robert bristow-johnson > a ?crit?: > > will minimax of margins decide differently than ranked > > pairs?? if the cycle has only three candidates, it > > seems to me that it must be equivalent to ranked pairs. > > It is the same with three. > > > is there any good reason to use minimax of winning votes > > (clipped at zero) over minimax using margins?? it seems > > to me that a candidate pairing where Candidate A just > > squeaks by Candidate B, but where a lotta people vote should > > have less weight than a pairing where one candidate creams > > the other, but fewer voters weighed in on it. > > Margins is basically what Peter originally suggested and what I was > trying to advise him away from. > > Margins on average is closer to IRV in results, WV closer to Bucklin. > Though both are closer to each other, of course. > > You say you find it more obvious to drop a close contest, but > it's only > the winning side of that contest that's going to feel the > outcome was > spoiled if they get overruled. The margins idea of "what looks right" > doesn't directly serve any purpose, yet by definition vetoes > more voters' > opinions than WV does, making more people wish they had just > voted FPP > style, or making candidates wish they hadn't entered the race. > > Margins elects A here: > 35 A>B > 25 B > 40 C > > Is this going to be defensible when this method is proposed? Can you > argue a case for A without mindreading off of the blank areas of > the > ballots? > > I don't think the tightest race is the one to drop. That could > be the > only race people thought mattered. > > Can you imagine if there were a very tight election between candidates > "B" and "G" let's call them, but because there was a third > candidate in > the race we may pick the *loser* of the B-G contest? > > I.e. the voters give you a single majority decision (more than > half the > voters) and that's the one you don't respect? > > Kevin ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
