2011/7/5 <[email protected]> > Jameson suggested that the SODA candidates make their approval decisions > sequentially instead of > simultaneously. > > The problem with this is that if a winning candidate moves to first place > in the sequence by an increase > in support, she may become a losing candidate: > > Assume sincere preferences are > > 35 A>B>C > 34 B>C>A > 31 C>A>B > > If approval decisions are made in descending order of faction size A, B, C, > then B wins. > > If B gains more support so that the totals become > > 34 A>B>C > 35 B>C>A > 31 C>A>B, > > the sequential order becomes B, A, C, and the winner will be C. >
No. B still wins. If A feels that C is winning, then A can delegate to B, and then B cannot lose. So C cannot be the winner. And therefore B will delegate to C, to force A's hand. Whether or not C delegates then is irrelevant. Of course, if A actually prefers C to B, and has managed to keep B ignorant of this fact, then C will win. But then, in such a case, A could have gotten the same result by being honest from the start. > > > How can we fix this? > > I don't think there's anything that needs fixing, though you may find another example to show I'm wrong. > How about allowing the largest faction (in this example 49 C) to go second, > and making the second > largest faction (in this example 27 A>B) go first? > > That would also work in the example above. How bad would it be in a worst > case example? > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info >
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