2011/7/6 <[email protected]> > By the way, when the delegations are done sequentially, the optimum > strategy for each player is > (generically) deterministic. No mixed strategies are needed to get optimum > game theoretic results. >
Yes, that's the point. > > Because of this, a DSV (Delegated Strategy Voting) version would give the > same result as rational > players. > Yes, but I don't recommend actually using the DSV version. Having candidates actually decide is a safeguard against candidates using dishonest strategy in the ranking - the only phase when dishonest strategy is possible. > > Therefore, we finally have a monotone, clone free, DSV that takes rankings > as input, and puts out > rationally determined approval ballots. > Well, you'd have to impute the most popular ranking among a candidate's voters to the candidate, and either use some direct approval strategy or make fake candidates for all other rankings among a candidate's voters... and that breaks the nice symmetry of the method somewhat, but none of it should break the monotonicity or the clone-freeness. > > This should be of interest to Rob LeGrand, who has done a lot of study on > DSV methods that turn > rankings into approval ballots. > > Furthermore, this gives us a way of generating Yee diagrams for SODA, i.e. > to make Yee diagrams for > Approval without just assuming that Approval will always find the Condorcet > winner. > Yes, that is true, with the caveats above. JQ
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