By the way, when the delegations are done sequentially, the optimum strategy for each player is (generically) deterministic. No mixed strategies are needed to get optimum game theoretic results.
Because of this, a DSV (Delegated Strategy Voting) version would give the same result as rational players. Therefore, we finally have a monotone, clone free, DSV that takes rankings as input, and puts out rationally determined approval ballots. This should be of interest to Rob LeGrand, who has done a lot of study on DSV methods that turn rankings into approval ballots. Furthermore, this gives us a way of generating Yee diagrams for SODA, i.e. to make Yee diagrams for Approval without just assuming that Approval will always find the Condorcet winner. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
