2011-09-05T09:28:14Z, “Jameson Quinn” <[email protected]>:
0thly, I recommend that you read this article:
http://web.archive.org/web/20080113211450/http://www.greenend.org.uk/rjk/2000/06/14/quoting.html
> Basically, ⸘Ŭalabio‽'s objection is that SODA does not allow non-bullet
> votes to be delegable. The reason that SODA is designed that way is not
> "paranoia", as ⸘Ŭalabio‽ claims, but rather simplicity.
Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder. What is simple for me is
choosing people whom I trust to represent my interests in the
Asset-Negotiations and leave them to their work. If some of them screw me
during Asset-Negotiations, I shall never vote for the bad 1s again. As far as
simplicity goes, SODA seems more complex to me than Asset-Voting.
> To see why multiple delegable votes would be confusing, consider the
> following scenario. Let us say that I vote for A and B. After the votes are
> counted, it turns out that all the other voters voted for X or Y, in a 50/50
> proportion. My delegated vote could be decisive. But A approves X, and B
> approves Y. So both of these approvals are added to my delegated vote, which
> ends up being useless in deciding between X and Y.
Either A or B would eventually by won over to the other side by
policy-concessions.
> Also, making multiply-delegated votes possible would entirely ruin
> SODA's summability. This would make a number of useful anti-fraud measures
> impossible, including precinct-level counting, sampled count audits, and
> voter-auditable cryptographic ballot receipts like those of heliosvoting.org.
Just make the allowable votes a fixed number. This is required in 1
form or another in proportional systems. Indeed, most of the problems with
SODA is that it is based on a system designed for creating a proportional
legislature, but is modified for both creating proportional legislatures and
for single-winner. These are 2 different domains and should use different
systems. The simplest methods for these domains are:
Single-Winner:
Approval-Voting
Proportional Legislature:
Asset-Voting
SODA should just forget about single-winner. Because it is based on a
proportional-voting system, it is ilsuited for single winner.
If voters want to make their votes in an Asset-Election
nontransferable, that is fine by me, but we should tell them that they run a
real risk of disenfranchising themselves.
> ⸘Ŭalabio‽, I understand and sympathize with your desire for multiple
> delegation, but I do not see how a SODA-like system could meet that desire
> without too high a cost in complexity and insecurity. If you think that you
> can resolve these issues, please propose a specific solution and explore its
> implications. As you know, voting system design often involves trade-offs,
> and so "doing P has disadvantage Q" is not a good objection against a system
> unless it's accompanied by "alternative S avoids Q without causing any other
> disadvantages as serious".
My solution is to scrap SODA SODA as being fundamentally flawed and use
Approval for single-winner and Asset with 9 votes for proportional with an
option to makes the votes nontransferable with the understanding that one
_“*PROBABLY*”_ will disenfranchise oneself if one makes the votes
nontransferable.
FairVote started wanting STV for a new house of proportional
representation or turning the House of Representatives into an house of
proportional representation using STV. FairVote settled for using STV for
single-winner which is IRV. We all know how lousy IRV turned out. SODA
repeats the mistakes of IRV:
One tries to use Asset for single winner, but it does not work well, so
one modifies it into SODA which instead of working well for single-winner and
proportional, works well for neither proportional nor single-winner.
The fact is that Asset works better than SODA for proportional
representation and Approval works better than SODA for single-winner. SODA
just is not a good tool for the job:
Let is suppose that we tell steelworkers to build a skyscraper using
only the tool Allen-Wrench. The steelworkers are the voters, SODA is the
Allen-Wrench, and the pile of rubble which is supposed to be a skyscraper is
the legislature. SODA is good for neither proportional representation nor
single-winner.
> Jameson
“⸘Ŭalabio‽”
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