I think voter/strategic simplicity, and system-description simplicity, are two different aspects. I certainly don't claim that SODA is any great shakes in system-description simplicity, though there are worse. But it's no more complex than the electoral college, and a giant leap more simple than how Obama beat Clinton. That is to say, there are a lot of people who are OK with not fully understanding a system. System-description simplicity is definitely good, but not in my opinion a non-negotiable necessity.
As to voter/strategic simplicity... sure, it's not perfect, but I still think it beats any other system I know of. Jameson Quinn 2011/9/5 Toby Pereira <[email protected]> > I'm not sure that three of those are unmatched by other systems. Point 1 - > I don't think it is the simplest system. I certainly don't think it's any > simpler than straight approval, and they've also got to decide whether to > delegate or not and they've also got to understand that their vote can be > delegated only if they vote for one candidate. You say they don't need to > defensively strategize, but I'm not sure how well the benefits of SODA would > get across to the general public. So it's not clear whether voters will see > the strategy as simpler. Even if the task of voting is relatively simple, > understanding the system and why it works like it does is not simple, and I > think you have to include that in the simplicity of a system. Overall I'd > say it's an above averagely complex system. And I don't know about in > America (although I can't imagine it would be much different from the UK), > but in the UK I simply canot see people ever accepting this idea of > delegating votes. It's a major paradigm shift and I think it renders it a > non-starter as a serious system to elect parliaments, if I'm being honest > (along with any other asset system). > > Also, if it is better for a voter to bullet vote and allow delegation (from > their point of view), then voters who like a candidate but don't like their > delegation list are presumably at a disadvantage to begin with, which > they may perceive as unfair. > > Point 2 - You've said yourself that IRV satisifes this, but then I notice > you've qualifed this earlier by saying any good system. Clever. > Actually, I even suspect that MJ may satisfy point 2, but for this point, not having clear evidence that a system is satisfactory is almost as bad as it definitely not being satisfactory. > > Point 3 - The chicken problem - yeah maybe. I'd have to get back to you. > > Point 4 - I imagine this is the one where it isn't unmatched by other good > systems. > > So if we're allowing point 2 on this technicality, I still think it's only > 2 out of 4, because I think it fails simplicity, and fails it badly. > Didn't say there weren't points where it failed :). Jameson > > Toby > > > > *From:* Jameson Quinn <[email protected]> > *To:* ⸘Ŭalabio‽ <[email protected]> > *Cc:* EM <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Monday, 5 September 2011, 19:31 > *Subject:* Re: [EM] SODA unfairly hobbles nonparanoid voters. > > SODA was initially designed as a single-winner system. I believe that as > such, it has four independent advantages, three of which are unmatched by > any other good system. > > 1. It is the easiest possible system for voters. No spoiled ballots, bullet > voting works, and no need to defensively strategize. > 2. It is "later-no-harm" enough to satisfy political incumbents who don't > want to be defeated by centrist nonentities. (This is also true of IRV, but > IRV has other problems) > 3. It resolves the chicken problem better than any other system I know of. > 4. I believe it would give good results overall - like Approval, Condorcet, > MJ, or Range. > > So if you are thinking of SODA as just being Asset shoehorned into a > single-winner case, then you don't understand the motivation, and either you > don't understand the system or I don't. > > JQ > > 2011/9/5 ⸘Ŭalabio‽ <[email protected]> > > 2011-09-05T09:28:14Z, “Jameson Quinn” <[email protected]>: > > 0thly, I recommend that you read this article: > > > http://web.archive.org/web/20080113211450/http://www.greenend.org.uk/rjk/2000/06/14/quoting.html > > > Basically, ⸘Ŭalabio‽'s objection is that SODA does not allow > non-bullet votes to be delegable. The reason that SODA is designed that way > is not "paranoia", as ⸘Ŭalabio‽ claims, but rather simplicity. > > Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder. What is simple for me is > choosing people whom I trust to represent my interests in the > Asset-Negotiations and leave them to their work. If some of them screw me > during Asset-Negotiations, I shall never vote for the bad 1s again. As far > as simplicity goes, SODA seems more complex to me than Asset-Voting. > > > To see why multiple delegable votes would be confusing, consider > the following scenario. Let us say that I vote for A and B. After the votes > are counted, it turns out that all the other voters voted for X or Y, in a > 50/50 proportion. My delegated vote could be decisive. But A approves X, and > B approves Y. So both of these approvals are added to my delegated vote, > which ends up being useless in deciding between X and Y. > > Either A or B would eventually by won over to the other side by > policy-concessions. > > > Also, making multiply-delegated votes possible would entirely ruin > SODA's summability. This would make a number of useful anti-fraud measures > impossible, including precinct-level counting, sampled count audits, and > voter-auditable cryptographic ballot receipts like those of > heliosvoting.org. > > Just make the allowable votes a fixed number. This is required in 1 > form or another in proportional systems. Indeed, most of the problems with > SODA is that it is based on a system designed for creating a proportional > legislature, but is modified for both creating proportional legislatures and > for single-winner. These are 2 different domains and should use different > systems. The simplest methods for these domains are: > > Single-Winner: > Approval-Voting > > Proportional Legislature: > Asset-Voting > > SODA should just forget about single-winner. Because it is based on > a proportional-voting system, it is ilsuited for single winner. > > If voters want to make their votes in an Asset-Election > nontransferable, that is fine by me, but we should tell them that they run a > real risk of disenfranchising themselves. > > > ⸘Ŭalabio‽, I understand and sympathize with your desire for > multiple delegation, but I do not see how a SODA-like system could meet that > desire without too high a cost in complexity and insecurity. If you think > that you can resolve these issues, please propose a specific solution and > explore its implications. As you know, voting system design often involves > trade-offs, and so "doing P has disadvantage Q" is not a good objection > against a system unless it's accompanied by "alternative S avoids Q without > causing any other disadvantages as serious". > > My solution is to scrap SODA SODA as being fundamentally flawed and > use Approval for single-winner and Asset with 9 votes for proportional with > an option to makes the votes nontransferable with the understanding that one > _“*PROBABLY*”_ will disenfranchise oneself if one makes the votes > nontransferable. > > FairVote started wanting STV for a new house of proportional > representation or turning the House of Representatives into an house of > proportional representation using STV. FairVote settled for using STV for > single-winner which is IRV. We all know how lousy IRV turned out. SODA > repeats the mistakes of IRV: > > One tries to use Asset for single winner, but it does not work well, > so one modifies it into SODA which instead of working well for single-winner > and proportional, works well for neither proportional nor single-winner. > > The fact is that Asset works better than SODA for proportional > representation and Approval works better than SODA for single-winner. SODA > just is not a good tool for the job: > > Let is suppose that we tell steelworkers to build a skyscraper using > only the tool Allen-Wrench. The steelworkers are the voters, SODA is the > Allen-Wrench, and the pile of rubble which is supposed to be a skyscraper is > the legislature. SODA is good for neither proportional representation nor > single-winner. > > > Jameson > > “⸘Ŭalabio‽” > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > > >
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