I'm not sure that three of those are unmatched by other systems. Point 1 - I
don't think it is the simplest system. I certainly don't think it's any simpler
than straight approval, and they've also got to decide whether to delegate or
not and they've also got to understand that their vote can be delegated only if
they vote for one candidate. You say they don't need to defensively strategize,
but I'm not sure how well the benefits of SODA would get across to the general
public. So it's not clear whether voters will see the strategy as simpler. Even
if the task of voting is relatively simple, understanding the system and why it
works like it does is not simple, and I think you have to include that in the
simplicity of a system. Overall I'd say it's an above averagely complex system.
And I don't know about in America (although I can't imagine it would be much
different from the UK), but in the UK I simply canot see people ever accepting
this idea of
delegating votes. It's a major paradigm shift and I think it renders it a
non-starter as a serious system to elect parliaments, if I'm being honest
(along with any other asset system).
Also, if it is better for a voter to bullet vote and allow delegation (from
their point of view), then voters who like a candidate but don't like their
delegation list are presumably at a disadvantage to begin with, which they may
perceive as unfair.
Point 2 - You've said yourself that IRV satisifes this, but then I notice
you've qualifed this earlier by saying any good system. Clever.
Point 3 - The chicken problem - yeah maybe. I'd have to get back to you.
Point 4 - I imagine this is the one where it isn't unmatched by other good
systems.
So if we're allowing point 2 on this technicality, I still think it's only 2
out of 4, because I think it fails simplicity, and fails it badly.
Toby
From: Jameson Quinn <[email protected]>
To: ⸘Ŭalabio‽ <[email protected]>
Cc: EM <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, 5 September 2011, 19:31
Subject: Re: [EM] SODA unfairly hobbles nonparanoid voters.
SODA was initially designed as a single-winner system. I believe that as such,
it has four independent advantages, three of which are unmatched by any other
good system.
1. It is the easiest possible system for voters. No spoiled ballots, bullet
voting works, and no need to defensively strategize.
2. It is "later-no-harm" enough to satisfy political incumbents who don't want
to be defeated by centrist nonentities. (This is also true of IRV, but IRV has
other problems)
3. It resolves the chicken problem better than any other system I know of.
4. I believe it would give good results overall - like Approval, Condorcet, MJ,
or Range.
So if you are thinking of SODA as just being Asset shoehorned into a
single-winner case, then you don't understand the motivation, and either you
don't understand the system or I don't.
JQ
2011/9/5 ⸘Ŭalabio‽ <[email protected]>
2011-09-05T09:28:14Z, “Jameson Quinn” <[email protected]>:
>
> 0thly, I recommend that you read this article:
>
>
>http://web.archive.org/web/20080113211450/http://www.greenend.org.uk/rjk/2000/06/14/quoting.html
>
>
>> Basically, ⸘Ŭalabio‽'s objection is that SODA does not allow
>> non-bullet votes to be delegable. The reason that SODA is designed that way
>> is not "paranoia", as ⸘Ŭalabio‽ claims, but rather simplicity.
>
> Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder. What is simple for me is
>choosing people whom I trust to represent my interests in the
>Asset-Negotiations and leave them to their work. If some of them screw me
>during Asset-Negotiations, I shall never vote for the bad 1s again. As far as
>simplicity goes, SODA seems more complex to me than Asset-Voting.
>
>
>> To see why multiple delegable votes would be confusing, consider the
>> following scenario. Let us say that I vote for A and B. After the votes are
>> counted, it turns out that all the other voters voted for X or Y, in a 50/50
>> proportion. My delegated vote could be decisive. But A approves X, and B
>> approves Y. So both of these approvals are added to my delegated vote, which
>> ends up being useless in deciding between X and Y.
>
> Either A or B would eventually by won over to the other side by
>policy-concessions.
>
>
>> Also, making multiply-delegated votes possible would entirely ruin
>> SODA's summability. This would make a number of useful anti-fraud measures
>> impossible, including precinct-level counting, sampled count audits, and
>> voter-auditable cryptographic ballot receipts like those of heliosvoting.org.
>
> Just make the allowable votes a fixed number. This is required in 1
>form or another in proportional systems. Indeed, most of the problems with
>SODA is that it is based on a system designed for creating a proportional
>legislature, but is modified for both creating proportional legislatures and
>for single-winner. These are 2 different domains and should use different
>systems. The simplest methods for these domains are:
>
>Single-Winner:
> Approval-Voting
>
>Proportional Legislature:
> Asset-Voting
>
> SODA should just forget about single-winner. Because it is based on a
>proportional-voting system, it is ilsuited for single winner.
>
> If voters want to make their votes in an Asset-Election
>nontransferable, that is fine by me, but we should tell them that they run a
>real risk of disenfranchising themselves.
>
>
>> ⸘Ŭalabio‽, I understand and sympathize with your desire for multiple
>> delegation, but I do not see how a SODA-like system could meet that desire
>> without too high a cost in complexity and insecurity. If you think that you
>> can resolve these issues, please propose a specific solution and explore its
>> implications. As you know, voting system design often involves trade-offs,
>> and so "doing P has disadvantage Q" is not a good objection against a system
>> unless it's accompanied by "alternative S avoids Q without causing any other
>> disadvantages as serious".
>
> My solution is to scrap SODA SODA as being fundamentally flawed and use
>Approval for single-winner and Asset with 9 votes for proportional with an
>option to makes the votes nontransferable with the understanding that one
>_“*PROBABLY*”_ will disenfranchise oneself if one makes the votes
>nontransferable.
>
> FairVote started wanting STV for a new house of proportional
>representation or turning the House of Representatives into an house of
>proportional representation using STV. FairVote settled for using STV for
>single-winner which is IRV. We all know how lousy IRV turned out. SODA
>repeats the mistakes of IRV:
>
> One tries to use Asset for single winner, but it does not work well, so
>one modifies it into SODA which instead of working well for single-winner and
>proportional, works well for neither proportional nor single-winner.
>
> The fact is that Asset works better than SODA for proportional
>representation and Approval works better than SODA for single-winner. SODA
>just is not a good tool for the job:
>
> Let is suppose that we tell steelworkers to build a skyscraper using
>only the tool Allen-Wrench. The steelworkers are the voters, SODA is the
>Allen-Wrench, and the pile of rubble which is supposed to be a skyscraper is
>the legislature. SODA is good for neither proportional representation nor
>single-winner.
>
>> Jameson
>
> “⸘Ŭalabio‽”
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