Hi Mike,
Nice to see you back.
--- En date de : Ven 14.10.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF <[email protected]> a écrit :
> Venzke's MMPO example
> 9999 A > B = C
> 1 A = C > B
> 1 B = C > A
> 9999 B > A = C
.
> and C wins. That seems quite counterintuitive.
.
.
Yes. C is the Condorcet loser.
But is Kevin sure that C wins in that example?
MMPO isn't usually defined as a Condorcet method, though it is very nearly one.
>From the criteria standpoint, MMPO was attractive because it satisfied weak FBC
as well as Later-no-harm. It also satisfies SFC, and in the three-candidate
case,
it won't fail SDSC.
I think there are two main bad things about the basic method:
1. The Plurality criterion failure (which is on display above)
2. Although it satisfies LNHarm, the defensive truncation strategy is still
viable and
recommended (by me, anyway).
Kevin
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