Ok. Maybe the meaning of the ballots should be expressed more clearly. In Kristofer Munsterhjelm's example (= your example modified) the votes are now fully ranked, and my example uses short notation although I had no intention to refer to implicit approval of the listed candidates. Notations that show both first preferences and/or approvals of listed candidates would be clumsy, so maybe the surrounding text should be used to mention such assumptions.
On the other hand your / Kristofer Munsterhjelm's example works fine and demonstrates problems of MMPO also without implicit approval and first place assumptions and plurality criterion. Juho On 15.10.2011, at 5.40, Kevin Venzke wrote: > Juho, > > Truthfully my damning MMPO scenario is meant to show a Plurality failure, so > the > last-preference rankings that Kristofer lists as equal are meant to be > truncated. > In other words, candidate C receives acknowledgement from TWO voters. > The appalling thing is not meant to be that the winner primarily has lower > preferences. > We would be able to choose from very few methods if that were the problem. > > Kevin > > --- En date de : Ven 14.10.11, Juho Laatu <[email protected]> a écrit : > > De: Juho Laatu <[email protected]> > Objet: Re: [EM] Comments on the declaration and on a few voting systems > À: "Election Methods" <[email protected]> > Date: Vendredi 14 octobre 2011, 15h11 > > If that one example set of votes is "bad enough" for MMPO, then how about > this example for PC(wv)? > > 49 A > 48 B > C > 03 C > > Juho > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
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