2012/3/9 Kevin Venzke <[email protected]> > Hi, > > *De :* Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[email protected]> > *À :* Kevin Venzke <[email protected]>; election-methods < > [email protected]> > *Envoyé le :* Vendredi 9 mars 2012 17h04 > *Objet :* Re: [EM] Obvious Approval advantages. SODA. Approval-Runoff. > > At 07:36 PM 3/8/2012, Kevin Venzke wrote: > > Hi Mike, > > > > I don't think Approval-Runoff can get off the ground since it's too > > apparent that a party could nominate two candidates (signaling that one > > is just a pawn to aid the other) and try to win by grabbing both of the > > finalist positions. If this happened regularly it would be just an > > expensive version of FPP. > > Number one. This objection does not apply to nonpartisan elections. > > > Not sure why it couldn't. You just wouldn't have a party, as > such, executing the strategy. > > > Number two. The strongest factor in elections is positive name > recognition. That's become obvious. By running two candidates, you are > diluting name recognition. If you have one, you might win. With two, quite > possibly not. Risky strategy. > > > Possibly true. > > > Number three. The strategy assumes that there will be no rivalry between > the two candidates. Even if they are in cahoots, their supporters may not > be. > > > You'd pick a second candidate who doesn't have supporters. > > > > Number four. Who gets the campaign funds? > > > It's a single campaign, so it doesn't matter. Presumably the serious > nominee gets them. > > > > Number five. Others can play the same game, if it's a real strategy. I > don't think it is. > > > I was actually assuming everybody (at least major candidates) would play > the same game. The problem > is that the second round doesn't play the role it was supposed to if this > happens. > > > > Number six. If this is a partisan election, who gets the party slot? The > strategy could badly backfire, as supporters of the non-party candidate > decide not to support the official party candidate, after all, the party > made a bad choice. No, the tradition is strong, and there are strong > reasons for it, that a party unites on a candidate. It's more powerful. > > > This seems to be the same as number three. > > > > Number seven. If both candidates make it into the runoff, very good chance > one of them would win anyway. This means that they are top two, really. If > this is nonpartisan, very difficult to reverse that. > > > The intention of the first round is to pick two finalists who are likely > to be the best winner. So if one finalist > gets both positions by running a weak clone, his odds of being the one who > would have won "anyway" are > probably better than half, yes. The criticism is that the second round > serves little purpose if that's what is > happening. > > > Number eight. You might be able to figure out a scenario where this makes > some sense. > > Now, compare that scenario with the real and known hazard of center > squeeze. > > > And where should that lead me? You know that nobody is backed into a > corner where they have to > advocate either an approval runoff or nothing. > > > > Besides, once we are Counting All the Votes, a ranked version of approval > becomes far better. > > > My simulations do often find that specific rank/approval hybrids are the > best wrt minimizing insincerity and > electing sincere CWs and utility maximizers. It depends on the scenario, > but JGA's Approval-Weighted > Pairwise is often the best Condorcet method and my various "Single > Contest" methods are usually the > best non-Condorcet ones (especially wrt sincerity). >
Note that Kevin still hasn't run simulations for SODA, because it requires assumptions about candidate strategy, and has different ballot types than other systems. Kevin, I haven't forgotten about resolving those issues with you; I think that they can be worked out. Jameson > > "Single Contest" methods are actually like an instant approval runoff, > except the finalists are the two > candidates who together minimize the number of voters who approved neither > of them. > > Kevin > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >
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