On 9/29/12 4:49 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
What is a "strong" Condorcet method?
yeah, and Kristofer, since the word is quoted, who is using the label? i think it might very well be something to agree with (the use of a really general adjective like "good" or "favorable" or even "optimal"), i would like to know w.r.t. what? it's like my high school teacher prohibited us from writing "This book was good" in a book report. certainly not saying the word is meaningless in context, but it semms to me meaningless when naked.
but, that said, i still think that a cycle with a Smith set bigger than 3 is soooo unlikely since i still believe that cycles themselves will be rare in practice. since Minmax, Ranked-pairs, and Schulze all elect the same candidate in the case of the Smith set of size 1 or 3, it seems to me that simplicity of tabulation becomes a "strong" property for two different but related reasons:
1. simplicity is a strong selling point and a necessary one in an environment of public opposition to "tricky" government procedure. sometimes complexity in government is unavoidable (how many pages of text is in a typical bill?) and sometimes the simplest method is clearly not the best (say, flat income tax rates vs. progressive income tax rates). but when it comes to seeing how our leaders are elected and how our miscreants and recalcitrants are dealt with, the public has an interest in transparency and some of this transparency is mandated in our national constitutions. but we *do* put up with reasonably complex regulations and tax codes, we can put up with a teeeny bit of complexity (the Ranked ballot vs. the "traditional" ballot) in voting.
but the method of tabulation must be reasonably simple for the method to gain public acceptance and trust. i think most people can understand the statements: "If more voters prefer Candidate A to Candidate B, then Candidate B is not elected." and i think that people can understand the concept that if Candidate A is ranked above Candidate B on their ballot, this voter would simply vote for A on a traditional ballot if only the two candidates were running.
selling the additional "burden" of having to commit to and mark their contingency vote(s) is the challenge, and i usually respond with the common argument we used in the old IRV days, and it still applies: it is worth it to collect your (and others) contingency vote because, to get it later (in a run-off) decreases voter participation and makes the election less legitimate, particularly if it's close.
2. predictability of operation of a system (like government) is pretty useful to people affected by the system. we want cars and other vehicles to behave consistently so that when someone pushes the lever, the system moves in the direction they intend it to. it may not move the system sufficiently to accomplish their goal, but it doesn't move the system directly away from their intended direction. in a modern, free, and decent society we need consistent laws and proceedures to have some idea what to expect and what is expected of us. capriciousness or "flakiness" is a quality to avoid. now when this happens, it's good in its own right (because it's fair and likely more ethical) but it also provides more for public acceptance because the rules are clear.
lastly, i know is anecdotal, but the Burlington 2009 IRV election really bolsters my confidence in cycles being rare (and then cycles bigger than 3 being even more rare). it was a close election. one candidate was the Plurality winner, one candidate was the IRV winner, and one candidate was the Condorcet winner. all three candidates were viable players and there was a fourth, independent, candidate that had a lot of support but was the first to be eliminated. but when ordered by Condercet, it is clear who is consistently preferred over everyone else. remove the CW and it is clear who comes in next. remove the 2nd-place CW and it is clear who came in 3rd. it was very consistent and nothing would change if various candidates were removed from the roster and the same voters came and vote (ranked) identically in another election. no spoiler scenario in any manner. and that was a close election.
maybe, once in a blue moon, there will be a cycle involving Candidates Rock, Paper, and Scissors, and then Ranked-Pairs, which is simple, will do just as well as Schulze.
Markus, i think Schulze would work better for bigger Smith sets, but i still think it's harder to sell for multip-party, multi-candidate, governmental elections. and since, i believe it would likely never make a difference, i would advocate ranked-pairs. i know you sent me that one paragraph language for possible legislation, but it surely read opaquely when i read it. i couldn't figure it out from that concise language (but i think i *do* understand how Schulze based on margins works).
-- r b-j [email protected] "Imagination is more important than knowledge." ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
